Friday, 9 November 2007

More guidelines, and a remarkable injustice

Within a few hours of the previous entry on this blog, speculating that the appeal court might make more use of its power to issue sentencing guidelines in the future, the court has issued an opinion doing just that. (Recommended Lottery numbers may appear here later.) The case is Spence v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 64.

Spence refines the guidance on sentence discounting for guilty pleas originally formulated in Du Plooy v HM Advocate 2005 JC 1. Two main points arise from the case.

(a) Contrary to the view taken in Roberts v HM Advocate 2005 SCCR 717, it may in fact be appropriate to give a discount for a “restricted” plea of guilty which is not accepted by the Crown but is, in effect, accepted by the court in its verdict: most obviously in a murder trial where the Crown rejects a plea of guilty to culpable homicide but that is the verdict returned by the jury.

(b) The guidance offered in Du Plooy – that discounts should “not normally exceed a third of the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed” – is expanded and refined. The full guidance is found in paras 14-15 of the Lord Justice-General’s opinion. Briefly, it sets out a usual discount of one-third for an accelerated guilty plea under section 76 of the 1995 Act, a discount of one-quarter for a plea at a first diet or first preliminary hearing, and a discount of one-tenth or less for a plea at the trial diet.

None of this was of any value to Mr Spence himself, however. Although, prior to his trial for murder, his agents had asked whether the Crown would accept a plea of guilty to culpable homicide (and had been rebuffed), no such plea had ever been formally tendered. Accordingly, the appeal court said, there was no basis for a discount despite the jury having returned a verdict of culpable homicide. In fact, in sentencing him, the trial judge had erred in “taking into account” his agents’ efforts to persuade the Crown to accept his plea. The appeal court went on to conclude that the sentence imposed had actually been inadequate and increased it from eight years in a Young Offenders Institution to ten.

This outcome is disturbing, to say the least. Although the appeal court unquestionably has the power to increase a sentence on an appeal by the accused, leave to appeal has been required since 1995. Logically, this should render such increases rare at the very least (see Hendry v HM Advocate 2006 JC 129, at [6] per Lord Justice-Clerk Gill). If the appeal court persists in exercising this power, it has the absurd result that an accused who lodges a appeal against sentence is at no risk of having his sentence increased if his appeal is hopeless (because leave will be refused and the appeal will proceed no further), but if a judge of the High Court decides that his appeal is arguable and grants him leave to pursue it, suddenly he is at risk of his sentence being increased. That cannot be just.

Sentencing guidelines: a new development?

Since 1995, the High Court has had the power to pronounce “sentencing guidelines” in appropriate cases, under section 118(7) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. However, the power does not appear to have been explicitly used until 2003, when the appeal court offered guidance on the appropriate discount for a plea of guilty (Du Plooy v HM Advocate 2005 JC 1) (although thanks to Fiona Leverick for pointing out that in Ogilvie v HM Advocate 2002 JC 74, the appeal court offered "sentencing guidelines" in respect of downloading indecent photographs of children from the internet without referring directly to section 118(7)).

Last week, the power was explicitly used for the first time in respect of a substantive offence. In Zhi Pen Lin v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 62, the court invoked section 118(7) in order to say (at para 13) that “the appropriate starting point for… "gardeners" involved in relatively large scale operations [of cultivating cannabis] will ordinarily be in the range of 4 to 5 years' imprisonment”.

Until relatively recently, that was a range of sentences open only to the High Court, but sheriffs' sentencing powers in solemn cases were increased from three to five years on the 1st May 2004. (This implemented section 13 of the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997: it is not only section 118(7) which has had to wait some time for practical effect.) It may be that the vastly increased number of judges who can now impose relatively long sentences of imprisonment will encourage the appeal court to make more use of its power to issue sentencing guidelines.

That is not the justification offered directly by the appeal court in Zhi Pen Lin, which refers instead (at para 10) to “a degree of disparity, at least in the High Court, in the sentences so far pronounced on persons convicted of relatively minor involvement in such activity”. However, the fact that many future "gardening" prosecutions may take place in the Sheriff Court (see the examples given at para 9 in Zhi Pen Lin) means that it would be impossible to end such disparities by means of informal discussions between the relatively small number of High Court judges. Whether this means that more extensive use of section 118(7) can be expected in future remains to be seen.

Thursday, 8 November 2007

Contempt, again

Contempt of court seems to be flavour of the week. Yesterday, a Full Bench of the High Court issued opinions in Robertson v HM Advocate; Gough v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 63. The leading opinion, delivered by Lord Justice-Clerk Gill, is an important review of the law of contempt and the attendant procedure.

(One of the cases under consideration involved four findings of contempt against Stephen Gough, the celebrated "naked rambler" who repeatedly insisted on appearing nude in court. Those wishing to follow Mr Gough's exploits should head over to the Scots Law News blog, where at present approximately one in every 20 of the near-700 entries on the blog details a particular chapter in his travails. A search for "Gough" on the home page will bring up a handy chronological summary.)

Three significant points arise from the opinions:

(1) It is not necessary for a presiding judge to remit an alleged question of contempt to a colleague provided it is clear that the contempt is not directed at the judge personally (see para 82). That "overrules" a note issued by the then Lord Justice-General (Cullen) in February 2004 suggesting that questions of contempt should normally be remitted to a second judge. The ECHR jurisprudence on which that note was based has since moved on, and it is significant that the course suggested in Lord Cullen's note does not appear to have been followed in respect of any of Mr Gough's contempts, the earliest of which was in November 2005.

(2) Lord Gill states that for cases where the relevant facts are in dispute (a problem which did not arise in these cases), a detailed code of procedure needs to be "devised urgently". It appears that this will be done by the court itself, "by Act of Adjournal after the usual process of consultation with the Rules Councils" (see para 102).

(3)
There is a useful discussion of the nature of contempt of court which will doubtless be of relevance to Mr Anwar's case (see previous blog entry), but does not preempt the questions raised by Lord Carloway there. On the one hand, Lord Gill relies on Petrie v Angus (1889) 2 White 358, where Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald referred to the "power and, indeed... the duty of the court, in order to protect the dignity, quietness, and regularity of its proceedings, and to prevent defiance of its orders". Such a power and duty does not seem readily applicable to actions outside the courtroom after the jury's verdict is returned. But at the same time, Lord Gill also refers (at para 29) to conduct that "wilfully challenges or affronts the authority of the court", which on one reading could cover such actions.

An aside: All five members of the court were clearly frustrated by the extent to which counsel relied on Article 6 of the ECHR in submissions. Lord Gill, in particular, acerbically remarks (at para 64) that "[i]t seems at times that contemporary practitioners believe that the Convention introduced the principle of fair trial into Scottish criminal procedure. Scottish criminal procedure is founded on that principle."

Tuesday, 6 November 2007

An unprecedented contempt case

About two weeks ago, Lord Carloway indicated that he was considering whether comments made by the solicitor Aamer Anwar to the media after Mohammed Atif Siddique’s conviction for terrorism offences might have been a contempt of court. Today, he has announced that he is remitting the matter to the High Court in Edinburgh for a decision. His full reasons have been published on the Scotcourts website.

The case seems unprecedented, focusing as it does on comments made (a) outside the courtroom and (b) after the jury's verdict was returned, thus avoiding any question of prejudicing the trial itself. In theory, “slandering” or “murmuring” judges in such circumstances can be a crime, although there is no reported prosecution for the offence since 1870, when a disgruntled coal-merchant sent letters to the Lord Chancellor and Home Secretary falsely accusing his local sheriff of corruption (Alexander Robertson (1870) 1 Couper 404).

But Mr Anwar did not make any allegations of that sort, and this case is not as simple as that. It revolves around a variety of claims made by Mr Anwar after the jury’s verdict (his press release is quoted in full in Lord Carloway's reasons), which Lord Carloway said appeared to be in part untrue and misleading, an “unjustified attack on almost every area of the trial process, other than the defence”, “an attack on the independence of the Advocate Depute” and “an attack on the fairness of the trial and thus presumably an attack on the Court itself”.

Significantly, there is no suggestion that a private individual who made similar statements could have been in contempt of court – so no doubt the media committed no contempt by reporting Mr Anwar’s remarks. Instead, the possible contempt turns on his status as a law agent and the duties which he owes to the court by virtue of that status.

Although Lord Carloway could have chosen to press matters no further, it would clearly have been inappropriate for him to have personally decided that there had been a contempt given that the remarks could be taken as an attack on him directly. For that reason, a remit to another judge (or possibly judges) was inevitable once he had decided not to let the matter rest. Just as importantly, the scope of the law here remains unclear. As Lord Carloway puts it:

“…there may be wider issues which, for the sake of clarity to the legal profession and the media, may require consideration. If agents are to make public statements in cases in which they are instructed, to what extent are they entitled, with impunity, to include material in these statements which is: (i) untrue; (ii) misleading; (iii) personally critical of jurors, witnesses and their professional colleagues; or (iv) of a political nature unconnected with the case? Furthermore, is an agent instructed in a case entitled to hide behind the cloak of his client by maintaining that such statements emanate from or were instructed by that client? Is he entitled to prepare such statements and escape scrutiny by arranging for them to be delivered by a third party, such as a friend or relative of the client?”

It seems unlikely that anyone would claim that a solicitor has a right to do all these things, but treating them as contempts of court could have a dangerously chilling effect on freedom of speech. There is little light to be shed on Lord Carloway's questions by the existing case law on contempt, and so the court's final determination will be eagerly awaited.

P.S. One intriguing bit of trivia: the copy of Mr Anwar’s press release lists his qualifications as “MA(Hons), Dip RCR, LLB, Dip LP, NP”. An impressively full set of qualifications, not unusual for a lawyer, with the exception of the “Dip RCR”. So far, extensive research (i.e. Google) has thrown up only the Royal College of Radiologists’ Diploma in Obstetric Ultrasound as a possibility. Alternative suggestions on a postcard please.

Monday, 5 November 2007

The bicyclist and the sex offenders' register

According to a recent report in the Telegraph, a man by the name of Robert Stewart has been convicted of breach of the peace and placed on the sex offenders' register after being found by two cleaners having sex with a bicycle in a hostel room. Or, in the words of the Telegraph, "trying to have sex with a bicycle". So presumably he was unsuccessful (unlike Karl Watkins, whom the Telegraph reminds us "was jailed for having sex with pavements" in 1993), but quite what the test of failure is is unclear.

So what does this mean? For example, is it - as posters on some websites have been suggesting - now an offence to use a sex aid in a Scottish hotel room? (Thanks to one correspondent for the disturbing image of an Ann Summers-Halfords collaboration.)

Well, the Scottish offence of breach of the peace requires "conduct severe enough to cause alarm to ordinary people and threaten serious disturbance to the community... conduct which
does present as genuinely alarming and disturbing, in its context, to any reasonable person" (Smith v Donnelly 2002 JC 65, para 17). So, two thoughts:
  • For someone to commit breach of the peace in a "private" place, it must be shown that they were likely to be discovered (see, e.g., Thompson v Macphail 1989 SLT 637). Here, that seems to have been established by Mr Stewart's failure to respond when the cleaners knocked on the door several times. (Exactly what he should have said to them to indicate that they would be better off not entering is another question.)
  • Even if the likelihood of discovery is established, the conduct must still be shown to be sufficiently alarming. Most solo or consensual sexual activities probably fall far short of that standard, at least where the accused is trying to keep their actions private. And it's not even clear that sex with a bicycle in a hostel room meets it either. Confusing, yes. Alarming, maybe. But does it "threaten serious disturbance to the community"? How likely is that?
Not that this really answers the question of how you actually do have sex with a bicycle, but that's probably just as well. And if you don't have a bicycle, you're not immune from prosecution: the BBC has a report this morning of a man convicted for "simulating sex on a pavement" in Galashiels, and going further back, "simulated sex with a traffic cone" in Edinburgh. Perhaps reassuringly (but probably not), the latter offence appears only to have come about because no-one would sell the accused their trainers.