Thursday, 17 April 2008

A very bad news day

Today’s Scottish edition of the Times cannot have made pleasant reading for staff at Crown Office. Half of the front page was given over to a photograph of Fiona Bauld and her son Jamie, a 19 year old with Down’s syndrome who has a mental age of around 5.

A story inside, which is available online, reports how Mr Bauld was involved in a “minor fracas” with an Asian girl, who herself has learning difficulties. Apparently he “pushed her with one hand and told her to go away” while the two of them were at college, and both of them were told off.

According to the Times report, this escalated into a newspaper notice – placed by persons unknown – asking for witnesses to a “racial assault”, an interview of Mr Bauld by two police officers, who charged him with assault and a letter from the procurator fiscal saying that there was sufficient evidence to charge him, followed by a brief letter 7½ months after the incident saying that no proceedings would be taken.

This raises all sorts of questions, particularly in relation to the police interview, about which nothing will be said here. Something else is particularly bemusing: the purpose of the letter saying that there was sufficient evidence to charge Mr Bauld. Inevitably, trying to analyse a case on the basis of newspaper reports runs the risk of being unfair to those concerned, but the following points spring to mind:

A person with a mental age of around 5 could not be put on trial, because they would be incapable of understanding the nature of the proceedings and the inaccurately named plea of insanity in bar of trial would succeed. It is true that an examination of facts could then be held under section 55 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, but none of the orders available to the court where an accused is found to have done an act constituting an offence in such proceedings (ordering detention in hospital, an interim compulsion order, a guardianship order or a supervision and treatment order) seem remotely appropriate to a case such as this one.

(At least the court would have the option of making no order - something which was not historically possible. That caused serious difficulties some years ago when a sheriff substitute felt compelled against his better judgment to commit a person with Down’s syndrome who had been accused of a minor breach of the peace to hospital, and the High Court had to avoid this absurdity on appeal by finding a technical defect in the proceedings: see Barr v Herron (1967) 32 J Crim L 113.)

The Times has now reported an apology by Crown Office [the report bears tomorrow’s date but was posted online today] for the time it took to reach a decision in the case. Interestingly, at least from the Times’ quote, there is no apology for the decisions taken. This new report sheds a little more light on proceedings:

“One of the main sticking points for the authorities was the refusal by Fiona Bauld, Jamie’s mother and full-time carer, to allow intervention by social workers. Because this box was not ticked, the case stalled. Mrs Bauld, 46, told The Times: “I refused to have anything to do with social work. We have never had anything to do with them. Jamie is Down’s syndrome – he is not a delinquent. He had done nothing wrong.””

But hold on a second. If the inevitable outcome of criminal proceedings against Mr Bauld would have been no trial, no conviction, and no order by the court (and it is difficult to see any other possibility, always acknowledging the possibility that the Times report does not reveal the full facts), then how could a prosecution possibly have been justified? And if a prosecution could not be justified, can it be even remotely legitimate for a prosecutor to hold open the possibility of charges in order to pressure someone to accept social work intervention? According to the Times, a Crown Office spokesman said:

“The family were aware that the Procurator Fiscal was exploring the possibility of dealing with this case in a way that would have provided additional support to Jamie. This did not prove to be possible and therefore no proceedings were taken.”

The reference of “a way that would have provided additional support to Jamie” surely means some alternative to prosecution. But alternatives to prosecution are just that: they are actions which can be taken when a prosecution would otherwise be in the public interest. Where an accused person refuses to accept an alternative to prosecution, the prosecution should be proceeded with. If proceeding with the prosecution in the absence of an acceptance would not be in the public interest, there can surely be no basis for proposing the alternative in the first place.

And this is only one of three appearances by Crown Office in the newspaper today. The Times also devotes attention to the Mental Welfare Commission’s scathing “Justice Denied” report on the case of Ms A, a 67 year old woman with a learning disability who appears to have been the subject of repeated assaults which have led not to criminal proceedings against her alleged assailants, but instead to subjecting Ms A to a “protective regime that effectively deprives her of much of her liberty”. The Times report is not online, but there is a BBC News story online, and a summary of the report can be downloaded from the Commission’s website. The Commission say they “believe that the responses of health, social care and criminal justice combined to deny Ms A access to justice”. Crown Office, who relied on professional advice which the report criticises, escape largely unscathed from the report, but few other agencies do. It is unfortunate, therefore, that Crown Office are the only agency quoted by the BBC when they seem to have the least explaining to do.

And alongside all that, a report stating that more action is needed on wildlife crime (but mostly, it seems, from the policing side) must have seemed like positively good news.

Tuesday, 15 April 2008

Defence against what?

I have received an email asking me to sign an open letter to “defend Aamer Anwar” (that is, against the contempt of court allegations against him: see this earlier post). The email comes from the Glasgow Stop The War Coalition, and the letter – first published, it appears, on the 8th November 2007 in the Herald – is available here on the Scotland Against Criminalising Communities website. The email also links to a commentary in The Firm magazine, which is critical of the contempt proceedings against Mr Anwar.

What is interesting is the synopsis of the allegations against Mr Anwar made by the authors of that letter, and also the presentation of those allegations by The Firm magazine. The open letter states as follows:

“Following sentencing on the 23rd October, Aamer Anwar was ordered to appear at a court hearing before the Judge. He was accused of showing disrespect to the Judge, the Jury and the Court.”

The Firm chooses not to provide a synopsis of the allegations, but instead quotes directly from Lord Carloway’s note regarding Mr Anwar. The Firm’s quote looks like a summary by Lord Carloway of the allegations against Mr Anwar, but omits several of the allegations. For whatever reason, The Firm has chosen not to use ellipses (that is “…”) to indicate gaps in the quote: instead, it is presented as a single block of text. The quote is a total of 161 words, drawn from a section of Lord Carloway’s note totalling 2,162 words. A reader of The Firm would understand the allegations against Mr Anwar to be as follows:

“The statement seems to be an attack on the fairness of the trial and thus presumably an attack on the Court itself.
The essence of the problem here is that the remarks do not emanate from a former litigant or accused person or even a third party commentator. Rather they come from the agent instructed in the case.
It also seemed to be a criticism of the Court as not being an independent and objective forum for the determination of criminal charges but part of a system of unfairness and repression. Finally it seemed to be an attack on the terrorist laws themselves.”

There are a number of omissions here, but what is particularly intriguing is that neither the open letter nor The Firm’s extract note the very first concern expressed by Lord Carloway, which was that the statements made by Mr Anwar:

“…appeared, at least in part, to be: (a) untrue; and (b) misleading. For example, the opening sentence of the statement [“Mohammed Atif Siddique was found guilty of doing what millions of young people do every day, looking for answers on the internet”], which received widespread media coverage, was not true. The panel had been convicted of specific statutory offences, which did not involve looking for answers on the internet. They involved downloading, concealing and retaining material for the purposes of terrorism and creating websites for the distribution of other material intended for the same purpose. …”

This is a far more serious allegation than “disrespect”, and probably more serious than anything quoted by The Firm.

Does that mean contempt proceedings against Mr Anwar are justified? The answer is no. Courts have a power to punish contempts in order to protect the integrity of their proceedings and prevent defiance of their orders, and it is impossible to see how either of these points could be said to be in issue as a result of Mr Anwar’s public statements. As I said in this earlier post, treating such statements as contempt of court could have a dangerously chilling effect on freedom of speech. But at the same time, it is wrong to claim that Mr Anwar is being hauled before the High Court for mere “disrespect”. I would happily sign a letter defending Aamer Anwar – but only one defending him against the actual allegations made against him.

Saturday, 29 March 2008

Voluntary intoxication as a defence to rape

Thanks to Findlay Stark for drawing the following case to my attention:

Marek Mierzwa stood trial at the High Court on a charge of raping a 16 year old girl with the mental abilities of a younger child. The jury acquitted him of rape, but convicted him of what appears from the BBC News report to have been an offence under section 311 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003. (I use that rather cumbersome formulation because it’s not clear what the offence should actually be called, as the statute, unhelpfully, doesn’t give it a name. But the offence is constituted by engaging in a sexual act with or towards a mentally disordered person who does not consent or is incapable of doing so by reason of mental disorder.)

What is significant about the case is the trial judge’s explanation of the jury verdict, reported by the BBC as follows:

“Jailing him, Judge Roger Craik QC said, “The jury must have thought you were very drunk at the time of commission of this offence and were probably not fully aware of what you were doing. Presumably that is the reason for the jury finding the rape charge against you not proven.” But, added the judge, the jury obviously came to the view that Mierzwa should reasonably be expected to know the identity and nature of his victim.”

Does this make sense? Scots lawyers tend to take the view that voluntary intoxication can never be a defence to a criminal charge, a principle which flows from the decision in Brennan v HM Advocate 1977 JC 38. There are some difficulties with applying the principle in Brennan to crimes of intent (see this earlier note on HM Advocate v Purcell [2007] HCJ 13), but as the mens rea of rape requires only recklessness as to a lack of consent, the reasoning in Brennan could be much more readily applied to a case like Mr Mierzwa’s.

But, of course, this demonstrates one problem with the decision in Brennan: is recklessness really generic in nature, which can be matched up with whatever criminal actus reus the accused commits thereafter? In Ross v HM Advocate 1991 JC 210, the appeal court sought to rationalise Brennan by saying that where voluntary intoxication negated mens rea the accused would be “assumed to have intended the natural consequences of his act” (at 214 per the Lord Justice-General (Hope)).

That has problems of its own, because Lord Hope referred to situations “where the condition which has resulted in an absence of mens rea is self-induced”, which does not quite make sense. If intoxication has resulted in the accused doing something he would not have done sober, in what sense has intoxication “resulted” in the absence of mens rea, which would have been absent in any event?

But the issue is different here. The absence of consent to sexual intercourse is not a consequence of anything (it is a circumstance), so does this mean voluntary intoxication can be a defence to a charge of rape? Assuming that Scots law is to continue to take a strict approach to the unavailability of intoxication as a defence, presumably it should not be (contrary to what Mr Mierzwa’s case seems to suggest), but Ross does not explain how that result would obtain.

Perhaps the best approach would be that suggested by section 2.08(2) of the Model Penal Code (endorsed by Lord Elwyn-Jones LC in in DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 at 475):

"When recklessness establishes an element of the offence, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial."

(Incidentally, the temporary judge’s sentencing remarks give some indication of the directions which were given to the jury as to the fault requirement under section 311 of the 2004 Act, something on which the statute is itself silent.)

Saturday, 15 March 2008

"Passing a bad law is a criminal act"

An article I wrote for tomorrow's Sunday Herald has just been published on their website. Unfortunately, some paragraphs have been lost in the editing process which means that an article which started out as a defence of the Scottish Law Commission's proposals to take sex between children under 16 out of the criminal law's scope - while raising some doubts about the Commission's proposed "proximity of age" defence - now looks like a self-contradictory attack on the proposals altogether.

(In addition, the Sunday Herald has taken out a few words in the first paragraph which mentioned that even teenage kissing could be a criminal offence in England and Wales under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. I suspect they might have taken them out because the claim seemed so ridiculous as to be patently incorrect, but sadly it's true. There's a good explanation available on the BBC News website.)

For the record, the article should have ended as follows:
"This is not to say that the fears of bodies like the Christian Institute can be ignored. There must be a danger that if the Commission’s proposals make it into law, then some teenagers will misinterpret the changes and believe that the age of consent has been radically lowered. That is better addressed by education than by passing unenforceable laws, but it means it is crucial that the Scottish Government considers exactly how to communicate the effect of new legislation.

And just one other thing. In proposing a defence for teenagers two years or less apart, the Commission seems to be concerned that they may not know each other’s exact birthdays. So, they suggest that the defence should be based on “whole age”. That is, if a boy of 16½ engages in sexual activity with a girl just turned 14, they would be regarded as only two years apart. But that would cause problems when the boy turned 17 and the girl was still 14 – would their ongoing sexual activity suddenly become criminal now that they were three years apart?

Ah, says the Commission, we have a solution: there will be a supplementary defence saying that sexual activity between teenagers three years apart in “whole age” will not be criminal if they had previously engaged in sexual activity while they were only two years apart. But that cannot be right. On that basis, the law would tell this hypothetical couple that, to avoid committing a crime, they were obliged to start engaging in sexual activity on the evening of the boy’s 17th birthday unless they wanted to wait six months until the girl turned 15.

It surely cannot be right that the law should encourage teenage sexual activity in this way. Of course, teenagers are hardly likely to keep a copy of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act on their bedside tables to guide their sexual choices, but that is hardly the point. Criminal law is supposed to be addressed to the public, and if a rule of the criminal law has to be defended on the basis that no-one other than lawyers will pay attention to it, it is a bad rule."

Friday, 22 February 2008

Prejudicial publicity: two seductive fallacies

From the BBC News website today, an interesting report of arguments presented in the Luke Mitchell appeal. Here, in a nutshell, is the issue as the BBC have summarised it:


“His defence lawyers insist the intense media coverage may have influenced jurors at his trial in Edinburgh.”

“But appeal judges were told that the coverage was 'self inflicted'.”


Both these arguments are superficially attractive, but to accept them would be to accept two fallacies. It is almost inevitable that the summary, although I have no reason to doubt its fairness, does not do justice to the arguments that have been presented in court. Because of that, what follows is not meant to be a criticism of the counsel concerned, who will have presented far more detailed and nuanced arguments than could possibly be represented in a two line summary. The news report, however, does provide an opportunity to explore the two fallacies, which have proved dangerously attractive to courts in the past. (Much of this is based on arguments made in Chalmers and Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2006), paras 18.19 and 18.22.)


(a) “Intense” does not equal “prejudicial”

The idea that “intense” media coverage is prejudicial is superficially attractive, but many shocking cases receive “intense” coverage. Surely they cannot be incapable of being tried? This clearly worried Lord Taylor CJ in the Rosemary West case, where he rejected an argument based on prejudicial publicity by saying:


“[the] question raised on behalf of the defence is whether a fair trial could be held after such intensive publicity adverse to the accused. In our view it could. To hold otherwise would mean that if allegations of murder are sufficiently horrendous so as to inevitably shock the nation, the accused cannot be tried. That would be absurd.” (R v West (Rosemary) [1996] 2 Cr App R 374, at 386)

But that is to miss the point. If X is to stand trial for a shocking series of murders, it surely cannot be “prejudicial” to say that X is suspected or accused of a shocking series of murders, no matter how “intensively” and repeatedly that statement is made. After all, provided such statements are accurate, they do no more in effect than give publicity to the indictment, itself a public document setting out the allegations which will be laid before the jury at the outset of a trial.

It would be prejudicial to say, for example, that X is suspected of other murders which are not the subject of the trial; or that X has committed other murders or other crimes; or that there are particular reasons – especially if these relate to matters which cannot be the subject of evidence in court – to believe that the allegations are true.

In other words, what matters first is not the intensity of the coverage, but its content. It is surely only if the content is prejudicial that the question of intensity becomes relevant. The problem Lord Taylor identified in R v West is illusory.

(b) Self-infliction: should we care?

The Crown appear to have argued that Mitchell’s defence team were responsible for fanning the flames of press coverage. That may be right, and there is some support in the case law for the argument that where an accused does this he can hardly complain of the consequences (see R v Savundranayagan and Walker [1968] 1 WLR 1761).

But, when properly considered, the answer to the Crown’s argument should now be “so what?” The point of an appeal based upon prejudicial publicity must be that an accused’s right to a fair trial – both at common law and under article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights – has been violated (Montgomery v HM Advocate 2001 SC (PC) 1). The right to a fair trial can be waived, but waiver must be “voluntary, informed and unequivocal” (Millar v Dickson [2001] UKPC D4, at para 38 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill).

No doubt “self-inflicted” publicity could meet that test – for example, if an accused deliberately sought to frustrate his trial by engineering a prejudicial newspaper article with details of his previous convictions on the eve of trial. But outside extreme circumstances such as that, the idea that “self-inflicted” press coverage goes so far as to be a “voluntary, informed and unequivocal” waiver of the right to a fair trial must be near-impossible to sustain.

Sunday, 17 February 2008

Lost in the post

For a variety of reasons, this blog has been relatively quiet over the last couple of weeks – for which, apologies. By way of an update, a brief note on PF (Dumfries) v Cotton [2008] HCJAC 8 (thanks to Findlay Stark for drawing the case to my attention).

The appeal is concerned with a narrow point. Mr Cotton was prosecuted for speeding. Under section 1(1) of the Road Traffic (Offenders) Act 1988, as amended, a person cannot be convicted of that offence (and others) unless steps are promptly taken to warn him of the possibility of prosecution, one of which is the serving of a “notice of intended prosecution”. Section 1(1A) provides as follows:

A notice required by this section to be served on any person may be served on that person -

(a) by delivering it to him;

(b) by addressing it to him and leaving it at his last known address; or

(c) by sending it by registered post, recorded delivery service or first class post addressed to him at his last known address.

(2) A notice shall be deemed for the purposes of sub-section (1)(c) above to have been served on a person if it was sent by registered post or recorded delivery service addressed to him at his last known address, notwithstanding that the notice was returned as undelivered or was for any other reason not received by him.

(3) The requirement of sub-section (1) shall in every case be deemed to have been complied with unless and until the contrary is proved.

In Mr Cotton’s case, the notice was sent by recorded delivery, and it was later established that this had been lost by the Royal Mail before delivery. The justices concluded that – on the basis of section 1(3) – this “proved” that the requirement of service had not been complied with and so acquitted Mr Cotton.

The appeal court has overturned that decision, and it is difficult to see how they could possibly have come to any other conclusion. Section 1(1A)(c) does not require receipt, and even if there were any room for doubting the point, section 1(2) makes the same point clear beyond any possible doubt.

That may seem a harsh conclusion, but it seems reasonable that fiscals should be able to rely upon registered post in such cases, and that must surely be the intended purpose of section 1(2). The consequences of a failure in the postal service are unfortunate, but it is difficult to see any actual prejudice arising as a result – and if for some reason actual prejudice did arise this could, of course, form the basis of a separate plea in bar of trial.

Sunday, 10 February 2008

"I won't make love to bruv"

That was the headline which the Scottish Sun chose to give the report of the prosecution of Danielle Heaney (22) and Nicholas Cameron for incest (28). The pair, who had the same mother (but different fathers) had met only once as children and formed a sexual relationship in August 2006. A brief report is available (inaccurately headlined as “Incest Brother and Sister Jailed”) in the Daily Record online.

Until relatively recently, it was not unusual to see the argument that the state had no business criminalising incest, on the basis that if sexual activity between relations was already criminal where one was under the age of consent, and if both parties were consenting adults it was none of the law’s business (see, eg, N Morris and G Hawkins, The Honest Politician’s Guide to Crime Control (1970)).

That argument seems to have gone out of fashion, on the basis that incestuous relationships are invariably continuations of abusive relationships commenced in childhood and so should be criminalised on this basis (see, eg, J Temkin, ‘Do we need the crime of incest?’ (1991) 44 Current Legal Problems 185). This line of argument is most clearly demonstrated by the Home Office’s 2000 review of sexual offences,
Setting the Boundaries, which argued for the retention of the prohibition against incest, as part of a broader offence of familial sexual abuse:

“The primary aim of the law in this area should be to protect against sexual exploitation within the family, especially young and vulnerable people.” (para 5.5.3)
“The dynamics of relationships within families change as children grow up, but patterns of domination started in childhood can continue into adult life, and significantly affect adult behaviour. In particular the issue of whether an adult child or sibling can ever truly consent to a sexual relationship with a father or brother is questionable, and the law and practice need to recognise this.” (para 5.5.4)
“The review concluded that it would not be right to seem to legitimise sexual relationships between adult family members. The dynamics and balance of power within a family require special recognition, and we were concerned to ensure that patterns of abuse established in childhood were not allowed to continue in adulthood.” (para 5.8.3)
Curiously, the Review seems to have assumed that only one party – the “instigator” – would be prosecuted in respect of incest, even though any offence would permit otherwise:
“In principle... the law should be able to deal with perpetrators of either sex. It must be for the police as investigators and the CPS as prosecutor to determine who was the instigator, and who should therefore be regarded as culpable, on the facts of each case. That decision must be informed by a full knowledge of the relationship, and the length of time it has been going on.” (para 5.8.7)
While the argument that it is necessary to retain incest to – as the Review puts it – “ensure that patterns of abuse established in childhood were not allowed to continue in adulthood” is a strong one, it should give rise to doubts about the appropriateness of a prosecution where that is demonstrably not the case. It is difficult to see how a prosecution of both parties could ever be justified on this rationale. The Review seemed to think any problems of principle arising here could be sufficiently dealt with by acknowledging them and promptly ignoring them:

“One of our guiding principles was to uphold the rights of adults to consensual sexual relationships in private, reflecting the ECHR respect for private life. Siblings or half-siblings may meet as adults, not even knowing that they are related. They are attracted and a sexual relationship develops. It is important to recognise that that relationship would only be criminal if they knew they were related. This has even formed plots in soap operas. Such cases very rarely come to the attention of the law or are prosecuted.” (para 5.8.2)

The matter has caused controversy elsewhere. A German couple comprising a brother who had been adopted and only met his sister when he was in her early 20s and she was in her late teens have had four children. The brother (seemingly not the sister) has been prosecuted and the pair were reported in March 2007 to be appealing to the Federal Constitutional Court to challenge the German prohibition on incest. A
BBC News report stated that a ruling was expected in the “next few months”, but there do not appear to be any reports of an outcome online as yet.