Friday, 1 February 2008

Friday miscellanea number 6

Thanks to Scott Wortley for drawing my attention to the case and written answer canvassed in items (a) and (c).

Today’s word of the day, from Mr Duff’s initial writ in Duff v Strang, is “skaithless” (Mr Duff having asked that the defender be ordained to find caution “that the Pursuer be harmless and skaithless in his body and property”). The Dictionary of the Scots Language defines “skaith” as “damage, hurt, injury, harm, mischief”.

(a) Lawburrows in the High Court

The remedy of lawburrows – allowing a person to apply for another to find caution not to harm him, his family or property – has been described as “a method of primitive law enforcement in the absence of an effective police force and system of public prosecution” (JM Thomson, Delictual Liability, 3rd edn (2004), 5).

But as Thomson notes, “there is no doubt that the action is still technically competent”, and Duff v Strang [2008] HCJAC 4 is a recent example. The point here is a procedural one: after the sheriff held that Mr Duff’s application was incompetent and irrelevant, Mr Duff attempted to bring his decision under review in the High Court by way of stated case. In a detailed opinion, the court rejects that argument, reserving opinion on whether an appeal to the sheriff principal or the Court of Session would be competent in such a case.

(b) Top marks for sheriff’s tough love

An earlier post on this blog noted a deferral of sentence by Sheriff Foulis on Wednesday 19th December last year. Sentence on Richard Mullen, 15, described as “responsible for a crimewave in Blairgowrie” was deferred until the end of January on the condition that he did not approach or contact his father or brothers. Yesterday’s Scottish edition of the Metro reported as follows (p21):

“A one-boy crimewave has been a model citizen since a sheriff banned him from seeing his family, Perth Sheriff Court heard yesterday. Sheriff Lindsay Foulis called it ‘one small step for man’. As a reward, the ban looks set to be lifted. Richard Mullen, 16, from Blairgowrie, Perthshire, was handed the unique order after being charged with 50 crimes in just nine months.”

(c) Emergency workers, again

I have posted earlier about the extension of the Emergency Workers (Scotland) Act 2005 (see, most recently, this post). The following written Parliamentary answer was issued on Wednesday (see this link):

Margaret Curran (Glasgow Baillieston) (Lab): To ask the Scottish Executive what consultation was undertaken in relation to the extension of the Emergency Workers (Scotland) Act 2005.

Shona Robison: The extension of the Emergency Workers (Scotland) Act 2005, to cover doctors, nurses and midwives whenever they are on duty, fulfilled a manifesto commitment. Although no additional consultation was undertaken, the arguments of different stakeholders have been well rehearsed when the act was originally debated in Parliament in 2005.

The manifesto commitment was somewhat broader than suggested here. It was in the following terms:

“Those who work in the NHS do Scotland proud. They deserve the right to a safe working environment without the fear of assault. All too often they face violence and aggression. An SNP government will tackle this by extending Emergency Workers legislation to cover all NHS staff. (page 36 of the manifesto, available here as a PDF file).”

It is easy to understand why this has not (yet) been done, however: given the terms of section 8 of the Act, extending it to all NHS staff would probably not be competent by way of statutory instrument, but would instead require primary legislation. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the commitment was ever meant to be quite as broad as a literal reading would suggest: was it really intended to cover NHS staff (even lawyers, perhaps?) who do not come into contact with the public as part of their jobs?

Thursday, 31 January 2008

Overlapping offences and evidence
of crimes (arguably) not charged

HM Advocate v Grant [2007] HCJAC 71, decided last year but issued last week, is an interesting decision on the interrelationship between the offences of supplying and being concerned in the supply of a controlled drug. Basically, the problem seems to have been this: Ms Grant was charged with being concerned in the supply of a controlled drug (diamorphine). It appeared, however, that the Crown intended to lead evidence from three witnesses alleging actual supply of the drug.

Because supplying a controlled drug and being concerned in the supply of a controlled drug are different offences (under s4(3)(a) and s4(3)(b) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 respectively), Ms Grant’s agent submitted that the evidence which the Crown proposed to lead would be inadmissible. The sheriff upheld these submissions and the Crown appealed to the High Court.

This was complicated by the fact that the point had been continued from a first diet to the trial diet before being rejected by the sheriff, and there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 for an appeal from a decision at a trial diet. The court suggested that this problem could have been avoided by appointing a further diet to decide the point, but on the basis that this would be on the same day as the trial diet. I think I have seen something similar done in the High Court by a continued preliminary hearing being scheduled for the same day as a trial diet, but this is obviously an unattractive approach unless the pre-trial issue is one which will make no difference to the trial going ahead, regardless of outcome.

The court in Grant recognises this and suggests that the potential inconvenience to jurors and witnesses makes this technique undesirable. Ultimately, the problem is almost magically resolved by the court taking the view (see para 9) that in all the circumstances a (competent) Bill of Advocation in substantively identical terms could be substituted for the (incompetent) Note of Appeal, thereby sidestepping the problem on the basis that such a Bill can extend “to the review of a decision of any court of solemn jurisdiction” (Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s131(1)).

On the substantive issue, the court notes that in HM Advocate v Cormack 1995 JC 133, Lord Marnoch upheld a similar submission to that made on Ms Grant’s behalf, saying that it was “most unlikely that Parliament intended section 4(3)(b) of the 1971 Act to cover the actual supply of illegal drugs”. In HM Advocate v Kiernan 2001 SCCR 129, however, Sir Gerald Gordon (sitting as a temporary judge) had said that he was “not, with respect, convinced that actual supply cannot be charged as concern in supply”.

If Sir Gerald’s speculation were correct, then it would follow that the charge against Ms Grant encompassed the acts of which the Crown witnesses concerned were going to give evidence, and the defence objection would fall away. That, in substance, is what the court holds, saying (at paras 19-20):

As was held in Kerr v HM Advocate [1986 JC 41], it is not necessary for proof of a charge brought under section 4(3)(b) that evidence should be led of an actual supply of the controlled drug. But it does not follow from thus, as a matter either of definition or of logic, that evidence of actual supply by the accused is not relevant to proof that he was concerned in supplying the controlled drug. To say that something is not essential for proof of the commission of a crime is not the same as to say that it is irrelevant to such proof and therefore that the evidence in question is inadmissible. We cannot therefore support Lord Marnoch's reasoning in HM Advocate v Cormack, and must respectfully disapprove of that decision. His Lordship may have had in mind the canon of statutory construction expressio unius exclusio alterius. But that canon is "not to be applied rigidly or without careful thought for the context: it can be particularly dangerous if applied prescriptively": Craies on Legislation, 8th. ed., p.604.

It follows from the foregoing discussion that in our opinion the sheriff fell into error in holding that the evidence in question was inadmissible because it would serve to establish that "the accused was in fact guilty of another crime". What the Crown are offering to prove, and give notice to that effect in the charge, is that as an aspect of being concerned in the supplying of the controlled drug, the respondent made actual supplies to the three witnesses. This would constitute proof, not of another crime, but of aspects of a course of conduct amounting to a contravention of section 4(3)(b).

Tuesday, 29 January 2008

Breach of the peace, privacy and psychologists:
further details

I have now seen a copy of the indictment in HM Advocate v Macdonald [2008] HCJAC 5 (see earlier post). It contains two charges. The relevant part of the first is as follows:

“…you having been convicted on a charge of assault with intent to rape and having assaulted an 11 year old girl… and having been sentenced to 6 years imprisonment on 16 December 2006… did on 8 May 2006 at Her Majesty's Prison, Peterhead, conduct yourself in a disorderly manner and for the purpose of causing fear and alarm to [two complainers], did state to [them] that you were a dangerous predator and that you had not been rehabilitated, that you had fantasies of a sexually violent nature and that you intended to commit a sexually violent crime such that a life sentence would be the outcome, repeatedly stare at [the first named complainer] and you did place [both complainers] in a state of fear and alarm for themselves and for the lieges and you did commit a breach of the peace.”

The second is in broadly similar terms, but relates to different statements allegedly made by Mr Macdonald on a later date.

The terms of the indictment are similar to those in two earlier cases which did not proceed beyond the sheriff court, and they are worth comparing. In HM Advocate v Duguid 2005 SCCR 465 (Sh Ct), the accused was charged with having committed a breach of the peace in the following terms:

“…having been placed on the sex offenders register for life at the Sheriff Court, Perth, on 28 May 1998 for offences of lewd and libidinous practices against young children, did conduct yourself in a disorderly manner and knowing that there was likely to be a large number of children at a fireworks display there, dress yourself in such a manner as to be easily mistaken for a steward or first aid officer, position yourself adjacent to all the public facilities there, place a police officer who was in attendance at said event, to whom you are known and who was aware of the conviction aforesaid, in a state of fear and alarm for the safety of children and the public and did commit a breach of the peace.”

In that case, Sheriff Davidson held that the facts libelled were not sufficient to constitute a breach of the peace and reserved opinion on whether the reference to the previous conviction was competent.

In HM Advocate v Murray 2007 SCCR 271 (Sh Ct), the indictment libelled that the accused had previously been convicted of a serious assault on a young boy and that he had told social workers that he would assault and murder a child. There, Sheriff Vannet held that s101(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 only permitted a previous conviction to be led where it was an “essential fact in the proof of the substantive charge”, such as in respect of driving while disqualified.

Crown appeals in Duguid and Greig were abandoned. The three cases taken together seem to demonstrate that the point is of considerable practical importance, making the cursory treatment of the issues by the appeal court in Mr Macdonald’s case rather surprising.

The charge against Mr MacDonald is significantly different from these earlier cases, because the indictment libels that the complainers were placed in a state of fear and alarm for themselves (something which makes the relevance of Lord Marnoch's reference to Young v Heatly clear). Although there are obvious objections to breach of the peace providing a vehicle for detaining someone purely on the basis that it is feared they might commit a crime in the future, and that might form a basis for an argument that the words “and for the lieges” are irrelevant, their excision would not be fatal to the charges against Mr Macdonald.

If the psychologists were placed in a state of fear and alarm, then it is difficult to see how the charge could be irrelevant unless either (a) it is the law that a breach of the peace cannot be committed “in private” (or something similar) – not a proposition hitherto accepted by the courts – or (b) it is the law that reasonable psychologists are made of such stern stuff that they cannot be placed in a state of fear and alarm (or alternatively, that they consent to being placed in such a state as part of their job, and that such consent negates the alleged breach of the peace). That does not seem particularly plausible.

Perhaps there is some issue of public policy here. That seems to have been key to the argument made by counsel for Mr Macdonald, and as Sir Gerald Gordon notes in his commentary on Murray, "[t]he criminal law is not intended to inhibit probationers from telling their social workers about their fantasies and/or fears about what they may do”. That must be true, although as Lord Marnoch suggests in Macdonald, this may properly be a contextual matter for the jury. No doubt it should be very difficult to commit a breach of the peace when interviewed by a psychologist or social worker, but it should not be impossible.

The question which Sheriff Vannet decided against the Crown in Murray – whether references to a previous conviction were competent in support of such a charge – is not even touched upon, and so still awaits scrutiny by the appeal court.

Wednesday, 23 January 2008

Breach of the peace: privacy and psychologists

Macdonald v HM Advocate [2008] HCJAC 5 is a rather peculiar opinion on breach of the peace issued in October of last year but only uploaded to the Scotcourts website yesterday. (Thanks to Gerald Gordon for altering me to the case.) Publication would seem to have been postponed because of an order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981: the relevant page of the Scotcourts website indicates that one was issued the day before the date of the opinion.

The opinions are very brief and do not set out the terms of the indictment, but a Press and Journal report indicates that Mr Macdonald was alleged to have, when interviewed by two psychologists, said that he was a dangerous predator and intended to commit a sexually violent crime involving a child victim on his release from prison. The report implies that the breach of the peace charges were resorted to because of fears as to how Mr Macdonald might act on his release from a prison sentence.

By a majority, the appeal court held that the charges against Mr Macdonald were irrelevant. Lord Johnston (with whom Lord Clarke concurs) says:

“The material point is the context in which these answers were given. Whether or not, at least one of the two ladies was alarmed by the content of the answers, does not seem to us to be the material point. What seems to us to be much more important is that, and we decide this case purely on that question, that the context of the interview does not lend itself to the definitions of breach of the peace to be found in longstanding cases and rehearsed in two recent cases of Smith and Jones [Smith v Donnelly 2002 JC 65 and Jones v Carnegie 2004 JC 136] with regard to public concern.”

But what exactly does this mean? Just as it is “not the law… that a police officer is not to be regarded as a person liable to be affected by disorderly conduct” (Saltman v Allan 1988 SCCR 640, per the Lord Justice-General (Emslie)), surely it cannot be the case that it is impossible to commit a breach of the peace in this context? That seems to be the view taken by Lord Marnoch, whose dissenting opinion reads (in its entirety) as follows:

“In common with Lord Bracadale [the judge at first instance], I, for my part, would regard the arguments regarding the contextual aspect of this case as being ultimately for the jury to consider. At the same time, I do think that there are real questions arising from the fact that this offence was allegedly committed in private, and it may well be that the case of Young v Heatly 1959 JC 66, to which we referred by the Crown, will one day have to be formally reviewed by a larger court. There is nothing further I wish to say on the matter.”

It may be that a distinction can be drawn between Young v Heatly and the present case. In Young, a depute headmaster made indecent remarks and asked sexual questions to pupils in his room. A guilty verdict there might be rationalised on the basis that the remarks were substantively directed at the pupils (with all the consequences that entails in terms of alarm and fear for personal safety) in a way in which Mr Macdonald’s alleged remarks were not directed at his interviewers.

It is, of course, difficult to fully evaluate the decision without the actual terms of the indictment, which will hopefully be reported in due course. The case bears a striking similarity to HM Advocate v Murray 2007 SCCR 271 (Sh Ct) (noted at this earlier post), but there the charge was thrown out because it disclosed a prior conviction: the issue of relevancy was not discussed.

(Incidentally, the Press and Journal report mentioned earlier also includes, for no obvious reason, an attack on parole and early release from the Conservative justice spokesman, Bill Aitken and a statement by a spokesperson committing the Government to ending “automatic, unconditional release”. Mr Macdonald was serving a six year sentence – automatic early release applies only to sentences of four years or less. His release was not unconditional because of a supervision period set by the trial judge, and there is no indication that he served anything less than his full sentence – indeed, parole would have been rather peculiar given the statements he was alleged to have made. Perhaps no newspaper article on criminal law would be complete without boilerplate political statements such as these, but they seem less than helpful to a reader trying to understand the case.)

Tuesday, 22 January 2008

Splitting the difference

The draft Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 Fixed Penalty Order 2008 was published yesterday (thanks to Scott Wortley for drawing this to my attention). As it stands, it would, with effect from the 10th March 2008, increase the maximum fiscal fine from £100 to £300.

This follows on from the recommendations of the McInnes Committee, which recommended that either (a) the maximum level be doubled to £200, or (b) that a “more radical approach” be taken and the limit raised to £500. (See paras 11.35-11.42 of the Committee’s report.)

Monday, 21 January 2008

Corporate homicide and individual liability

Last Friday, there were further newspaper reports about pressure for corporate homicide legislation to provide for company directors to be held personally responsible for workplace deaths – something which is not provided for by the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. From the Herald:

“Grahame Smith, general secretary of the Scottish TUC, said there was "deep disappointment" the UK legislation would not hold individual managers to account. Labour MSP Karen Gillon introduced her own members' bill on corporate killing, but withdrew it after the UK Government brought forward its own plans. But she said she was prepared to reintroduce it after the £400,000 fines handed down to ICL Plastics and ICL Tech in the case of the Stockline factory explosion which killed 33 people.”

If the view taken prior to the 2007 Act – that the matter was a reserved one and so the Scottish Parliament had no power to legislate – is correct, then it is difficult to see how Ms Gillon’s bill being reintroduced could affect matters (unless, of course, the fact that we now have an SNP administration in some way affects the official view on which matters are reserved and which are devolved).

On the issue of principle, the reference to Stockline is particularly significant, although it is not new. Families Against Corporate Killing, whose campaign seems to have prompted the most recent reports, issued a statement last September, again invoking Stockline and asserting “the urgency of implementing strong deterrent legislation in order to save lives”.

It is strange to see Stockline repeatedly prayed in aid of the case for individual liability, because it demonstrates the weakness of the deterrent argument. The chief executive and another director of the company died in the blast. News reports at the time indicated that another director had been seriously injured and that the son of a fourth was pulled from the factory by firefighters. (See this Scotsman report.)

There may be good reasons for imposing criminal penalties on individual directors following workplace fatalities. But the case for individual liability which is being made at present seems to rest on the notion that if such cases were to result in severe consequences being visited on company directors, then such incidents would be prevented by “deterrence”. It relies on a particular stereotype of such cases, in which companies are neatly divided between employees (who take all the risk) and directors (who take none). Real life is sometimes rather more complex, and the Stockline tragedy demonstrates that quite clearly.

Friday, 18 January 2008

Friday miscellanea number 5

[Please note that the date of Professor Lacey's lecture was wrongly given as the 16th (two days ago!) in the original version of this post. This has now been corrected.]


(a) Public lecture on criminal law in Edinburgh

Nicola Lacey, Professor of Criminal Law at the London School of Economics, will deliver a public lecture at the University of Edinburgh on the 29th January 2008. The lecture takes place at 5pm in Lecture Theatre 175, Old College, and is on the topic “From Moll Flanders to Tess of the D'Urbervilles: Gender, Identity and Criminalisation in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century England".

Professor Lacey delivered both the Clarendon Lectures (on the same topic as her Edinburgh lecture) and the Hamlyn Lectures last year. Her last Hamlyn lecture is currently available as a podcast from the LSE website.

(b) Jury verdicts “under explanation”

According to the first appeal court decision of 2008, juries not only have the power to delete words from an indictment, but can also add extraneous words in the form of “explanations”.

In Fletcher v HM Advocate [2008] HCJAC 1, the accused was charged with being concerned in the supply of a controlled drug, the locus being specified in the indictment as “at East Car Park, Low Causeway, Culross; the public car park at Low Valleyfield; 52 Chapel Place, High Valleyfield; 67 Chapel Street, High Valleyfield; 6 Valleyfield Avenue, High Valleyfield; 23 Pentland Terrace, High Valleyfield; all Fife and elsewhere”. (Two other addresses in Fife had been included in the list but deleted on the motion of the Crown.)

When the jury returned their verdict of guilty, the foreman was asked if they had any amendments to make, and replied: “The verdict applies to 26th May at Bourtrees Farm services.” After discussion, it was agreed that the jury were to be understood as deleting references to the other places named in the charge, and the verdict was recorded as “The Jury by a majority find the accused Brian Paul Fletcher guilty on charge one (as previously amended) on 26 May 2004 at Bourtrees Farm Services.”

On appeal, counsel for Mr Fletcher objected that the verdict was incompetent, because the jury could not add words to a libel and so it did not specify a location within the jurisdiction of the court. The appeal court rejected this argument, saying that, given the words “and elsewhere” in the charge, it was open to the jury to return “a verdict of guilty under deletion of the specifically named locations but with an explanation as to what place or places elsewhere their verdict related. That in substance is what the jury did in the present case.” (para 8)

The court’s suggestion that juries can return verdicts “under explanation” may be contrasted with the hostility to riders evidenced by HM Advocate v Tracey [2007] HCJ 14 (see earlier post), but the two cases are obviously very different in nature. (Incidentally, if anyone has any idea where "Bourtrees Farm Services" actually is - a Google search for the name throws up no results - feel free to leave a note in the comments section.)

(c) An unusual confession

Finally, not a Scottish case, but one which is surely worth a mention: David Henton is currently standing trial for the murder of his long-term partner in Swansea. The main evidence against him is exceptional: apparently he confessed to his cats. (See, amongst other sources, the BBC News website and the Telegraph.) Sadly, there is no indication that the cats themselves will be asked to give evidence.