Tuesday, 15 January 2008

Oh, ye cannae fling hamsters oot
the third floor o' a flat [UPDATED]

According to the BBC News website yesterday, a man by the name of Andrew Thompson is standing trial in Dumfries Sheriff Court, the case against him being that he "went "berserk" in a third floor flat and recklessly threw a hamster in a cage and other items out of the window".

The precise charges against Mr Thompson are not clear from the report, but it does not seem that any specific charge has been laid in respect of the hamster. Instead, the charge presumably relates to the risk to the public caused by throwing the cage out of the window (the hamster's presence being, strictly speaking, irrelevant). This is an oddity of animal protection legislation. The relevant offence criminalises causing "unnecessary suffering" to animals (Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act 2006, s19, replacing s1 of the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912).

Hamsters are notoriously recalcitrant when interviewed by police officers, and it is not obvious how one would assess whether the hamster had "suffered" - even, it seems, if it had not survived the fall. In Patchett v MacDougall 1983 JC 63, a man shot and killed a collie dog. The appeal court quashed his conviction for an offence under the 1912 Act, noting that although there was no doubt that he had acted "wantonly and unreasonably", it could not be established that the dog had suffered.

Lord Wheatley suggested that the accused might have been charged with malicious mischief instead. If that is correct, then vandalism - under s52 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 - would have been an equally valid charge, but presumably his Lordship recoiled from endorsing a charge as absurd as vandalising a dog by shooting it dead.

Regardless of such questions of terminology, protecting animal welfare through property offences is an unsatisfactory solution, because such offences would be inapplicable where the accused himself owns the animal in question.

If Patchett v MacDougall suggested a defect in the 1912 legislation, it has not been remedied by the 2006 Act. Although that Act says that the offence of causing unnecessary suffering "does not apply to the destruction of an animal in an appropriate and humane manner" (s19(5)), it does not follow from this that destroying an animal in an inappropriate and inhumane manner is necessarily an offence. Nor, it seems, is throwing hamsters out of third-floor windows any different.

Update (3.25pm): The BBC News website now reports that Mr Thompson has been found guilty of a number of the charges against him (including recklessly throwing items from the flat window), but acquitted of some others. It is noted in this report that the hamster subsequently died.

Monday, 14 January 2008

Paying fines at the corner shop

In an opinion piece for the new journal Scottish Criminal Law a few months ago, I argued against certain changes being made to fiscal fines, concluding (half-jokingly) that “[c]riminal justice should require offenders to confront their wrongdoing, not merely be invoiced for it.”

This may not have been such a joke after all. Friday’s Evening News (click here) reports that the Scottish Court Service plans to allow offenders to pay fines at the corner shop, or by credit or debit card. No doubt this will be more convenient for offenders, but paying a fine is not supposed to be convenient. Coincidentally, a report in yesterday’s Sunday Herald (click here) is critical of the increasing use of non-court disposals, saying that:

“The latest figures reveal the use of warning letters and fiscal penalties to deal with low-level offences shot up from 72,000 in 2005-06 to 117,000 in 2006-07. Sara Matheson, president of the Glasgow Bar Association, said taking so many cases out of the courts posed long-term risks of re-offending. “Going to court was a disincentive to offending,” she said. "Now there is a danger of turning too many cases into paper exercises.””

Collection rates for fines are lower than anyone would like, and there are good arguments in favour of what the SCS proposes to do. But collecting fines and processing cases is not the aim of a criminal justice system – these are only means to an end. Whether measures such as these make for better prevention, deterrence and punishment of crime is a rather more difficult question to answer.

Friday, 11 January 2008

Friday miscellanea number 4 [UPDATED]


(a) Aamer Anwar, again

Mr Anwar is not having a happy time of it at the moment. Not only is he awaiting a High Court hearing regarding allegations of contempt of court (see
earlier post), judicial aspersions were cast upon his credibility as a witness at Glasgow Sheriff Court yesterday. After trial, Lorraine Ferrie was acquitted of a having committed a racially aggravated breach of the peace directed against Mr Anwar and his wife. According to the BBC News website, Sheriff Coutts said:

"
There were certain aspects in which the Crown witnesses Mr and Mrs Anwar were not credible… I find Miss Ferrie a reliable witness and, where her story was not consistent to that given by the Anwars, I preferred her evidence.”

(b) Backdating sentences

In
Simpson v HM Advocate; Christie v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 76, the appeal court has given guidance on the proper practice in backdating sentences to take into account time spent in custody before trial, in accordance with section 210(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. The question, as the court puts it, is straightforward: if a sentence is to be backdated, “should it be to the date of committal for further examination, or to the date of committal until liberated in due course of law (full committal)?” (para 1).

The normal practice, as the court observes, is to backdate to the earlier of these two dates (committal for further examination). It would be strange if it were otherwise, as that would fail to give any recognition to a period during which the accused had been deprived of his liberty. Nevertheless, in respect of Mr Simpson and Mr Christie, a Dundee sheriff – not named in the court’s opinion – took the view that because the statutory provisions refer to time spent in custody “awaiting trial or sentence”, backdating should only go so far as the date of full committal. This result arose, in his view, because an accused committed for further examination could not be regarded as “awaiting trial”.

In a brief opinion, Lords Nimmo Smith and Abernethy confirm that the normal practice is correct and that the sheriff’s approach in these two cases was wrong. They consider the sheriff’s construction of the phrase “awaiting trial or sentence” to have been incorrect, but argue that even if it was correct backdating is nevertheless a discretionary exercise and suggest that backdating might go back beyond even the date of committal for further examination, for example where the accused spent the weekend in police custody before that date.

Lords Nimmo Smith and Abernethy say that they felt it appropriate to issue their opinion because “there has not hitherto, so far as we are aware, been a decision of this Court about the proper interpretation and application of section 210 of the 1995 Act” (para 8). It is interesting that, despite the point of law involved, they were happy to proceed with the bare quorum appropriate for an appeal against sentence and did not consider it necessary for the case to be heard by a bench of three judges: that may indicate just how little persuasion they required in respect of the appellants’ cases.

[Update (11/01)] (c) HM Advocate v Tracey

An earlier post on this blog noted the procedural mess that had arisen in the case of HM Advocate v Tracey [2007] HCJ 14, after a judge purported to reject a guilty plea tendered by Mr Tracey which had been accepted by the Crown and signed by both Mr Tracey and that same judge. Mr Tracey was today sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment and put on the sex offenders register. From the report on the BBC News website, there is no indication of any point having been taken as to the competency of the proceedings.

Thursday, 10 January 2008

Post-mortem retention of body parts,
nearly a century on

According to the BBC News website yesterday, a relative of the victims in one of Scotland’s most notorious murder cases has called for the return of body parts which were taken by the two pathologists in the case, Sir Sydney Smith and Harvey Littlejohn, and are held by Edinburgh University.

Patrick Higgins stood trial for the murder of his two sons in September 1913, the case against him being that he had assaulted them and thrown them into the water-filled Hopetoun Quarry. He was found guilty, was not reprieved, and was hanged on Wednesday, October 1, 1913.

His trial is of some legal significance, because the judge, Lord Johnston, told the jury that they could not consider the partial defence of diminished responsibility, which was gradually coming to be recognised as a basis for reducing murder to culpable homicide. Lord Johnston told the jury that he could “understand irresponsibility, but I cannot understand limited responsibility… I desire very humbly to enter my protest against this doctrine being accepted as part of the criminal law and practice of Scotland until the matter is more deliberately dealt with by a larger Court” (HM Advocate v Higgins (1913) 7 Adam 229, at 233).

Interestingly, Sir Sydney Smith wrote quite openly about the “body-snatching” (as he termed it) in his popular 1959 book, Mostly Murder, which sheds some light on the decision to retain specimens from the post-mortem.

This was not, it seems, the arbitrary retention of body parts which simply happened to be available to the pathologist. The bodies of Higgins’ children had been in the water for almost two years before they were found, which meant that an unusual process had taken place. As Smith later explained:

“When a body is left for a long period in water, or buried in damp ground, it undergoes a distinctive change. Human fat, which is normally semi-fluid, is gradually converted to a fat that is quite firm, like mutton suet. This is adipocere. The conversion is a slow process, but permanent when complete. We were interested from a purely medical point of view, because extensive transformations are rarely come across, and these specimens were quite exceptional.”

According to Smith, a university magazine “at the time” went so far as to describe Smith and Littlejohn’s actions in verse:

“Two bodies found in a lonely mere,
Converted into adipocere.
Harvey, when called in to see ‘em,
Said, “Just what I need for my museum.””

Despite what this might suggest, the retention was hardly open and honest. At the post-mortem in Linlithgow, Smith arranged with Littlejohn for the latter to distract the attention of the two police officers present by asking them to leave the mortuary so that he could confer with them. While they were outside, Smith packed up a substantial part of the bodies (the heads, internal organs and half of the limbs), put the remains in a coffin and screwed down the lid. Smith and Littlejohn then took the train back to Edinburgh with the body parts parcelled up and placed on the luggage rack, in a crowded carriage on a day so hot that the pair feared that the smell would give their plot away.

Although the children’s mother had died a year before them, their grandmother was still alive and gave evidence at Higgins’ trial, as did two of his sisters and his brother in law (see The Scotsman, 11 September 1913, p7). From Smith’s account, it seems that none of them would have had any reason to doubt that the coffin contained the complete remains of their relatives. In 1959, according to Smith, the specimens were still on display at the university and used to illustrate adipocere formation to students.

Interesting legal questions might well arise in this situation, but in any event they have been forestalled by a statement from the University that it will return the remains provided that the relative who has made the request (Maureen Marella) can provide proof of her relationship to the two boys and that other surviving relatives agree. (As the case involves Edinburgh University, I should point out that I have no knowledge of the request and the current circumstances beyond what has been reported by the BBC.)

Update (10/1): Today's Scottish edition of the Times includes (on page 3) a lengthy report of the story, clearly drawing - as does this blog entry - on the account of the case in Sir Sydney's book. It also quotes Tim Squires, a lecturer in forensic medicine, who points out that the specimens have never been on public display.

Friday, 4 January 2008

Reform: the swifter the better

An earlier post on this blog noted the remarkably short timescale which the Government has agreed with the Scottish Law Commission regarding its new criminal justice projects. I have just seen an article in the Times Higher Education Supplement by Fiona Hyslop, the Education Secretary, which provides some insight into the Government’s current thinking on the appropriate timescale for review projects:

“As we work to build a prosperous and sustainable economic future for our nation, I believe the time is right to consider what Scotland needs from its universities between now and 2028.

That’s the role of our Joint Future Thinking Task Force. I want this to be a short, sharp exercise that delivers results – not a talking shop or an independent inquiry that takes two years to reach a conclusion.”

(“Building on the past, looking to the future”, THES 21 December 2007. For the Government’s press release (20/12/07) announcing the creation of the taskforce, which is to meet monthly until this summer, click here.)

Thursday, 3 January 2008

Disclosure in criminal proceedings

McDonald v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 75 is a decision in three appeals concerning the currently high-profile issue of disclosure in criminal proceedings. The substance of the appeal is important, but some asides regarding the possibility of an obligation of disclosure being placed on the defence are perhaps more significant.

The appeal turns largely on the validity of two calls in petitions for the recovery of documents. (The calls made in a petition on behalf of the third appellant were more specific and his petition was continued to consider them.) Both of these calls were in the following terms (see para 4):

"1. All material in the possession of or under the control of the Lord Advocate which ought to have been (and ought to be) disclosed in terms of his [sic] obligation under Article 6(1) when read with section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998.

2. Failing principals, drafts, copies or duplicates of the above whether in paper or in digital form."

These terms are remarkably broad, and the Lord Justice-General was less than complimentary about the submissions made in support of their validity, stating (at para 5) that counsel for the appellants “presented a wide-ranging and essentially unstructured submission. We endeavour to summarise it…”. Subsequently (at para 47), the Lord Justice-General states that this submission “amounted in substance to the tautological proposition that the Crown had a duty to disclose what it had a duty to disclose”, going on to say (at para 56) that this “is true but tautological and, for practical purposes, accordingly useless”.

Against that background, it is unsurprising that the appeal court declined to make the orders sought. The courts are reluctant to grant orders in terms which merely restate a general legal obligation (so, to take an example from a different context, an interdict against “defamatory statements”, with no further specification, would be illegitimately wide: Shinwell v National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union of Great Britain 1913 2 SLT 83) and it is difficult to see what use orders in the terms proposed would have been or how it would have been possible to establish if they had been complied with.

Although the point concerned may, put this way, seem rather narrow, the case is important as reaffirming that the general test for disclosure laid down in McLeod v HM Advocate (No 2) 1998 JC 67 – that the Crown “disclose all material evidence for or against the accused" – remains the relevant overarching principle despite the recent decisions in Sinclair v HM Advocate 2005 SC (PC) 28 and Holland v HM Advocate 2005 SC (PC) 3. The current importance attached to the issue is demonstrated by the fact that the Lord Advocate appeared in person before the court.

As noted earlier, an interesting feature of the decision is the attention paid to the question of whether the defence should be required to make advance disclosure of their case, even though that issue did not arise before the court. The Lord Advocate submitted (in the words of the Lord Justice-General) that “[t]he changes in practice engendered by Holland and Sinclair also required a change in culture from the defence. The information it held should be made known to the Crown, to allow the latter's obligations to be met. This could be in the form of a letter at precognition stage.” (para 24). The Lord Justice-General goes on to say (at para 58) that “[t]here may be an advantage in an accused being required, to a greater extent than at present, to give notice of what his defence to any charges is.”

This discussion seems connected to the recent review of disclosure (click here) by Lord Coulsfield, who considered this issue and concluded (at para 7.8) that “I have not been convinced that a general requirement for a defence statement would give any significant additional benefit, to justify the additional work and cost which would be generated.” He therefore declined to recommend such a requirement.

Despite this, the Scottish Government has chosen to specifically consult on the question “Do you agree that the defence should not be required to provide a defence statement following initial disclosure by the Crown…”? (A Statutory Basis for Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings in Scotland: Proposals for Legislation… (2007), Question O). That consultation closes on the 25th January. It seems reasonable to conclude (a) that we know how Crown Office will be responding to that question and (b) that they will now be fortified by what looks like at least tentative judicial support.

Friday, 21 December 2007

Friday miscellanea number 3

(a) Prejudicial publicity

Thanks to Scott Wortley for drawing my attention to Sinclair v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 27, which deals with a point raised prior to the abortive World’s End murder trial. Sinclair's counsel argued here that he could not receive a fair trial due to adverse pretrial publicity, in particular direct speculation about whether he was responsible for the World’s End murders, including material which continued to be available on the internet. (The opinion was issued some months ago, but for obvious reasons could not be published at the time.)

The decision – rejecting Mr Sinclair’s plea – reflects the invariably sceptical approach of the Scottish courts to pleas in bar of trial based on allegedly prejudicial publicity. This is accompanied with a strong faith in juries to discharge their functions properly and not be affected by such matters. This faith is, of course, near impossible to shake given that the courts are unwilling to allow more than the most rudimentary pretrial questioning of jurors and the Contempt of Court Act 1981 largely prohibits it post trial.

Pretrial publicity is also one ground being considered in the ongoing Luke Mitchell appeal (see Mitchell v HM Advocate [2006] HCJAC 84, where the appeal court overturned the decision of the single judge not to specify that ground as arguable). It seems unlikely to be the key issue there, but the point is an interesting one, particularly because Mr Mitchell’s counsel had argued at first instance that not the trial should be halted, but that it should be heard outside of Edinburgh. There is little case law on such motions and the relevant test is unclear: if a fair trial can be expected in the court to which the Crown has indicted the case, does the court nevertheless have a discretion to require it to be held elsewhere just to be on the safe side? Of course, even if the court does have such a discretion, a failure to exercise it cannot in itself be said at a later stage to be a miscarriage of justice.

(b) Sentencing and family life

Thanks to Alyson Evans for drawing my attention to this BBC report of a rather unusual deferred sentence passed by Sheriff Foulis in Perth on Wednesday. Richard Mullen, 15, and described as “responsible for a crimewave in Blairgowrie” has had sentence in respect of certain offences deferred until the end of January on the condition that he does not approach or contact his father or brothers. According to the BBC, Sheriff Foulis said (the “quote” runs together comments made both to and about Mullen):

"If there is any prospect of success in respect of this young man then he really has to cut ties with his father and brothers… When you leave this court today you are in no shape or form off the hook. I can potentially come down on you like a ton of bricks… This must be considered a last opportunity to avoid a life spent with significant periods in custody… His brothers and father are leading him down a path to Polmont and then to adult prison."


The case bears certain similarities to Reid v Napier 2002 SLT 1229, where R was sentenced to two years’ probation on condition that she did not visit her boyfriend (who was then in prison). R was pregnant with her boyfriend’s child, who was born shortly afterwards. The appeal court rejected an argument that the condition was incompatible with her right to respect for family life under article 8 of the ECHR. The condition imposed by Sheriff Foulis is, however, not quite the same given that Mr Mullen is a child himself.

(c) Lockerbie: further developments

Robert Black has written a fascinating blog post on the second procedural hearing in the Lockerbie appeal, which seems to have thrown up a number of significant issues including public interest immunity and a renewed attempt to argue that when the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission refers a case to the appeal court, the appeal should be restricted to the issues identified by the Commission. Click here to read it.