Thursday, 20 December 2007

Stop and search and political posturing

Last weekend, it was reported that the British Transport Police had carried out over 14,000 stop and search operations at train stations in Scotland since July, as compared to a total of 135 by all Scottish police forces in 2007. That led to a demand for an explanation from the Scottish Justice Secretary, Kenny MacAskill, who said that the situation “seems to me to be unacceptable” and that he was planning to hold a meeting with the BTP about the situation. (See this report on the BBC News website.)

Today, a UK transport minister, Tom Harris MP, who represents a Glasgow constituency, has written to Mr MacAskill demanding an unreserved apology for his “outrageous” comments (click here for a report and a clip from a radio interview with Mr Harris). In his letter, he defends the BTP’s actions as follows:

"Terrorists have recently targeted transport infrastructure in this country (London Underground and Glasgow Airport) and it is therefore right that the BTP are vigilant and do everything practicable within its authority to disrupt and deter terrorist activity."

It might have been better for Mr Harris if he had omitted the bracketed text, which rather weakens his point. British Transport Police’s remit runs only to national rail services and the London Underground (click here for a brief discussion of the BTP’s remit and its future).

It follows, therefore, that Strathclyde Police – and not the BTP – have responsibility for policing Glasgow Airport, the Glasgow Underground, Prestwick Airport and the road network throughout their area. (It is not clear to me which of the two has responsibility for the Glasgow suburban rail network outside of the mainline stations.)

As the minister responsible for the BTP, Mr Harris must be taken to be aware of their remit. So it is unfortunate that he chose to comment directly about the necessity for stop and search operations, rather than (say) concentrating on the manner in which Mr MacAskill made his comments and saying something about the need to trust the BTP's professional judgment. As it is, it is difficult not to take Mr Harris' comments - although they are unlikely to have been intended this way - as being a clear criticism of Strathclyde Police (and other Scottish forces) for not exercising stop and search powers.

While Mr Harris was quick to criticise Mr MacAskill for not telephoning the BTP to discuss the matter before making his criticisms public, it emerged during his radio interview that he had not phoned Mr MacAskill himself, but had instead written a letter – which he released to the media before it was received by Mr MacAskill.

Regardless of whether stop and search powers are being legitimately exercised or not, neither of the politicians involved – and certainly not Mr Harris – seems to come out with much credit. Apologies all round? (Unlikely.)

[Update (2/1/08): A comment posted to this article states that the BTP do in fact police the Glasgow Subway (the official name for the system). On further checking, it appears that BTP took over policing duties for the Subway in early 2007. Apologies for the error (and also for the delay in publishing the comment and making this correction, due to the Christmas break). That weakens, but does not seem to invalidate, the argument made here.]

Wednesday, 19 December 2007

Reforming sexual offences

I understand that the Scottish Law Commission's Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences is to be published today. If so, the report should be available shortly at this link, and a news release summarising it should be available here.

[Update (19/12): See now news reports in The Herald (with a separate commentary including a piece by Sandy Brindley of Rape Crisis Scotland), The Scotsman (including a commentary by Fiona Raitt) and on the BBC News website.]

Tuesday, 18 December 2007

It's the bicycle that makes the difference

In the first post on this blog, about Robert Stewart’s sexual escapades with a bicycle in an Ayrshire hostel, I included a link to the case of Steven Marshall, who pled guilty to simulating sex with a Galashiels pavement after drinking while taking medication for arthritis.

At the time, Sheriff Drummond deferred sentence for background reports and placed Mr Marshall on the sex offenders’ register for five years. He seems now to have decided that this was unnecessary: according to the BBC News website, he ruled yesterday that there was not a significant sexual aspect to the case, and so Mr Marshall could be sentenced to 12 months probation without being placed on the register.

It seems rather odd to say that there is not a significant sexual aspect involved in simulating sex. (Perhaps not, though: actors and actresses interviewed about filming sex scenes invariably remark about how non-sexual they are. Unless you’re Jonathan Rhys Meyers, who when asked about The Tudors (click here and scroll down), somehow stumbled into saying “But when you’ve worked with somebody like I’ve worked with Natalie Dormer for a second season and then you’re kind of like doing a sex scene, you know each other so well, it’s like a sex scene with your sister…”)

But why is this even the relevant question? Isn’t public indecency – the offence to which Mr Marshall pled guilty - by definition a sexual offence in terms of the sex offenders’ register? The answer to that question is not apparent on the face of the legislation. In Scotland, the relevant offences are those listed in paragraphs 36-60 of Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003. They include at paragraph 42 “[s]hameless indecency, if a person (other than the offender) involved in the offence was under 18”, and at paragraph 60 (as a catch-all provision) any offence not specified in the list “if the court, in imposing sentence or otherwise disposing of the case, determines for the purposes of this paragraph that there was a significant sexual aspect to the offender’s behaviour in committing the offence”.

The question asked by Sheriff Drummond is relevant under paragraph 60 but not under paragraph 42. So, which does Mr Marshall’s case fall under? Does “shameless indecency” include “public indecency”? This apparent ambiguity arises because the 2003 Act was passed before the appeal court judicially abolished the crime of shameless indecency and replaced it with the (supposedly) narrower crime of public indecency (Webster v Dominick 2005 JC 65).

The ambiguity has, however, been addressed by the appeal court in Nelson v Barbour 2007 SCCR 283, which seems to hold that the reference to “shameless indecency” in the 2003 Act must now be read as “public indecency”. On that basis, Mr Marshall’s case is a paragraph 42 one and any question of a “sexual aspect” was irrelevant. Instead, the correct question was whether someone under 18 was “involved”. (The answer to that question is uncertain. Being a witness is probably enough to be "involved" in a case of public indecency, given that the offence is based on the conduct's potential to offend those witnessing it. The BBC refers to a “young woman” as being one of the witnesses, but does not give her age.)

This analysis may be unfair, based as it is on a news report which does not set out Sheriff Drummond’s reasoning in full. Moreover, dealing with the case in this way seems to have reached a desirable result: it is not clear what good placing Mr Marshall on the sex offenders’ register would have done. But, remembering that Mr Stewart was placed on the register on the basis of the catch-all provision, the question has to be asked: why was it sexual for Mr Stewart to simulate sex but not for Mr Marshall? Is it the bicycle that makes the difference?

Monday, 17 December 2007

The reasonable time guarantee:
a fairly honourable defeat

Thanks to Tony Kelly for drawing my attention to Spiers v Ruddy [2007] UKPC D2, a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council issued last Wednesday. Here, the Committee has resolved the conflict between Scotland and England over the reasonable time guarantee in criminal trials.

Prior to Spiers v Ruddy, the position was as follows. (For discussion, see Himsworth (2004) 8 Edin LR 255.) In Scotland, where the right to trial within a reasonable time had been breached, the Lord Advocate would be acting incompatibly with the accused’s article 6 rights to proceed further, and so the prosecution would have to be brought to an end (R v HM Advocate [2002] UKPC D3). In England, proceedings could be halted only where a fair trial was no longer possible or it was unfair to try the defendant for a “compelling reason”; otherwise a lesser remedy could be given (Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68, a decision of nine judges). These decisions were reached by a majority: in both cases, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry were in favour of the absolutist position taken in R. (In that case, they had been joined in the majority by Lord Clyde.)

Both of these judges recant in Spiers v Ruddy, where the conflict is unanimously resolved in favour of the English position. It is a remarkably short judgment for such an important issue (a total of 29 paragraphs compared to 168 in R v HM Advocate and 179 in Attorney-General’s Reference). Rather than a full review of the issues involved, it is a reconciliation attempt which allows Lords Hope and Rodger to change their views with honour and without having to admit to any error at an earlier stage. The Committee seizes on some recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights which talk of the possibility of preventing a “continuation” of a breach of the reasonable time requirement and suggest that a breach can be remedied by “expedition” of proceedings. On that basis, it is said, the decision in Attorney-General’s Reference must now be preferred.

This decision dramatically weakens the protection offered by the reasonable time guarantee in Scots law (see also this earlier post on a possible shift in the time when that guarantee starts to run). Matters are now not all that different from the pre-Scotland Act position where delay would only result in proceedings being halted (on the basis of “oppression”) if a fair trial were no longer possible.

Spiers v Ruddy does allow for remedies short of barring a trial where the reasonable time guarantee has been violated, but these may not be particularly valuable to accused persons. In Attorney-General’s Reference, Lord Bingham said (at para 24) that “[i]f the breach is established before the hearing, the appropriate remedy may be a public acknowledgement of the breach, action to expedite the hearing to the greatest extent practicable and perhaps, if the defendant is in custody, his release on bail… If the breach of the reasonable time requirement is established retrospectively, after there has been a hearing, the appropriate remedy may be a public acknowledgement of the breach, a reduction in the penalty imposed on a convicted defendant or the payment of compensation to an acquitted defendant.”

It is not clear whether Lord Bingham meant to exclude sentence reduction as an appropriate remedy where a breach is established before a hearing, and there must surely be cases in which the other remedies suggested will not themselves be sufficient. There has been only relatively limited discussion in England of sentence reduction as an appropriate remedy for a breach of the reasonable time requirement, but there are at least two cases: Miller v DPP [2004] EWHC 595 (two year delay in speeding case meant that it was appropriate to find “exceptional hardship” established and thereby reduce the period of disqualification which M was otherwise due to serve as a result of totting up) and R v Wheeler (Darielle) [2004] EWCA Crim 572 (undesirable for W to go to prison for purchasing goods with stolen cheque books and credit cards five to eight years ago). It is unlikely that the courts will develop clear “sentence discounting” guidelines: these may be attractive as a means of encouraging people to plead guilty (see earlier post), but there is no such “case management” advantage here.

Friday, 14 December 2007

More Friday miscellanea [UPDATED]

(a) Drunkenness and mitigation

Thanks to Scott Wortley for drawing my attention to a Parliamentary written answer from the Justice Secretary on drunkenness as a mitigating factor in sentencing two days ago. The question and answer are as follows (click here for the original record):

Hugh Henry (Paisley South) (Lab): To ask the Scottish Executive whether being drunk is considered to be a mitigating factor in determining sentences.

Kenny MacAskill: High Court Judgments since the 1980s have made clear in common law that alcohol should not be regarded as a mitigating factor in crimes. The time is now right to review whether that message from the High Court is being heard clearly and consistently enough by those who have contact with or are involved in the criminal justice system. We are considering what measures may be necessary to make it explicit that being intoxicated at the time of the commission of an offence should not be submitted as a mitigating factor at the point of sentence.


It is not clear whether anything in particular has prompted this, and it is doubtful that there is any need for some kind of explicit rule. Apart from anything else, it is easy enough to imagine exceptional cases where intoxication could clearly be part of a plea in mitigation (imagine, for example, a case where someone inexperienced with alcohol has got drunk, committed some minor crime out of character and been so shocked by his actions that he has renounced alcohol and become a teetotaller?) A decision to “make it explicit” that intoxication is not mitigatory might be criticised as more a case of being seen to be doing something (compare this earlier post) rather than actually making a difference. (But it would be wrong to be churlish at this stage - a review can do no harm and is always to be welcomed.)

[Update (14/12): Thanks to FS (in the comments section) for drawing my attention to an earlier spat between Joe Beltrami and Mr MacAskill on this subject. For more details, see the BBC News website, and a rather mischievous exploration of Mr MacAskill's motives by Brian Monteith appears in the Evening News (scroll down to the second item).]

(b) Appealing a sentence, forty years on

Reid v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 70, published on the Scotcourts website today, is an (unsuccessful) appeal against a sentence imposed forty years ago. This was Mr Reid’s first such appeal – it is not a second appeal by virtue of a reference by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission. As such, it is probably some sort of record. (The normal time limit for lodging an appeal against sentence is two weeks, but that can be extended by the court under s111(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.)

Mr Reid had pled guilty to culpable homicide on the basis of diminished responsibility in 1967 and was committed to the State Hospital in Carstairs. He now sought to argue that the original hospital order should be quashed and a life sentence substituted in his place. That may seem an unusual contention, but the point was that his efforts to seek release from hospital had failed, and a life sentence would allow him to seek release by way of the Parole Board instead. Those circumstances themselves, of course, are merely the motivation for an appeal and not a basis for one, and it was always going to be difficult to persuade the appeal court that the initial order (pronounced without opposition) was a miscarriage of justice.

(c) Provocation and confusion

Touati and Gilfillan v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 73, published on the Scotcourts website yesterday, is an appeal against two convictions for murder. One of the appeals succeeded and the court has continued the appeal to allow the Crown to address it on the appropriate disposal. (The court has said it is minded to substitute a verdict of culpable homicide, but it may be that the Crown will want to seek permission for a retrial.)

The reasons for the appeal succeeding are complex, involving the correctness of the trial judge’s directions on a number of interrelated issues. In particular, the trial judge’s directions on provocation are criticised (see paras 30 and 31). In fairness to the trial judge, the difficulties there appear to be largely a result of the decision in Drury v HM Advocate 2001 SLT 1013. The appropriate directions have now been clarified by Gillon v HM Advocate 2007 JC 24, but that decision came some time after the trial in this case.

Thursday, 13 December 2007

Bad news for strippers

It is fair to say that the original decision to charge police stripogram Stuart Kennedy with possession of offensive weapons did not, after Sheriff Stewart acquitted Mr Kennedy last week (see earlier post), receive a sympathetic response in the media. Among the more entertaining of the various critical comments was the response of an anonymous retired constable in the Press and Journal. In his view, the case had “given the Grampian force a bad name” and he wondered whether the “the bosses of the two policewomen who questioned the Aberdeen stripogram were graduates in geography or economics or something else”.

Such criticism, however, has not deterred the Crown, which confirmed today that it has lodged an appeal against Sheriff Stewart’s decision. The full story is on the BBC News website.

P.S. Google Analytics has been counting the number of visits to this site since the 8th November. Between 3 and 4pm this afternoon, that number passed 1,000, which is very encouraging for a new site in a relatively "niche" area. Thanks for reading!

"I had that guy in the front of my cab once..."

Today’s Scotsman has, as its front page story, a report of a taxi driver acquitted of breach of the peace for allegedly racist remarks. Apparently John Young, 71, had been reported to the police by his (white) passengers who were angry at his use of the work “P***s” (as the Scotsman reports it) rather than “Asians”. (He also seems to have blamed members of that ethnic group for others being unable to get places at certain schools, but it seems to have been his choice of language rather than his claim which offended his passengers.)

I have already written a commentary on the case for the Scotsman (available here after the main story) and won’t repeat what is said there. The Scotsman has referred in its report to the earlier trial of Stuart Kennedy (see earlier post), suggesting that this latest case “adds to claims prosecutors are wasting taxpayers’ money”. In fairness to Crown Office, while the proximity of these two cases must be embarrassing, it has to be said that they represent only the most miniscule proportion of the many tens of thousands of cases prosecuted every year.

Nevertheless, objectionable as Mr Young’s alleged language may have been, it is difficult to see how it could have been said to amount in law to a breach of the peace (“conduct severe enough to cause alarm to ordinary people and threaten serious disturbance to the community”, as the court put it in Smith v Donnelly 2002 JC 65 at para 17).

In his commentary to the recent case of HM Advocate v Murray 2007 SCCR 271 (Sh Ct), where a sheriff threw out a charge of breach of the peace against a man who told social workers that he intended to assault and murder a child, Sir Gerald Gordon remarks (at 282) that “[t]he charge is somewhat of a throwback to the earlier view that if something happens which causes concern or should not have happened, it must be a crime, and if one cannot think of any other crime which suits the situation it must have been a breach of the peace.” Those remarks apply with even greater force here.