Wednesday, 12 December 2007

Distress as corroboration and authors as authority

The opinion of Lord Hodge in HM Advocate v L [2007] HCJ 16, published on the Scotcourts website yesterday, is an interesting discussion of the use of distress as corroboration in rape cases where it is not alleged that the accused used force to have intercourse with the victim.

To summarise the problem: where a complainer alleges that an accused had sexual intercourse with her by force, it is accepted that evidence of her distress after the event can be used as corroboration establishing both the truth of her account and the fact that the accused had the mens rea required for rape. However, it has not been accepted that distress can be used in this way where force is not alleged, particularly in cases where the charge of rape is based on a claim that the complainer was asleep at the time.

Lord Hodge sidesteps the problem by arguing that there was other evidence before him which could, in total be used to provide corroboration (see paras 6 and 13), and goes on to suggest that the problem may not be a real one at all: it is “unlikely that there will be many cases where the only independent evidence available to the Crown is evidence of distress” (para 15). I have suggested otherwise (2004 SLT (News) 141), but then it never occurred to me (and I still have doubts) that facts such as “the complainer had left behind her mobile phone, which suggested that she left in a hurry” and “the age gap between the complainer and the accused” could be used as corroboration of mens rea if distress could not. Nevertheless, the result is a welcome one, because some of the earlier decisions on distress as corroboration of non-forcible rape threatened to evidentially render that crime out of existence by making it impossible to prove.

One other point about Lord Hodge’s opinion is of interest. The question he addresses has – unusually for most questions coming before Scottish courts – already been extensively discussed in journal articles (Chalmers 2004 SLT (News) 141, Ferguson 2007 SCL 1, Redmayne 2006 JR 4, Scott 2005 SLT (News) 65). None of these articles is referred to, and it is unclear whether they were cited to the court. Lord Hodge – a former Scottish Law Commissioner – does, however quote the Commission’s treatment of the issue in its Discussion Paper on Rape and Sexual Offences.

The tendency of Scottish courts (and perhaps counsel appearing before them) not to refer to journal articles is sometimes characterised as a lack of receptiveness to academic opinion. Famously, when Lord Ross did refer to a Scots Law Times article in Deutz Engines Ltd v Terex Ltd 1984 SLT 273 he described it as a piece by “two individuals whom I understand to be academic lawyers” on which it was “not necessary or appropriate to pass comment”. But here, the absence of reference to journal articles can hardly be described as unfair to academics. Of the four articles listed above, the two by academics take broadly the same line as the Commission (which cites one of them). So the lack of reference to journal articles does not leave the academics out in the cold. Instead, and perhaps ironically, it is the views of two QCs over which the opinion passes without comment.

Tuesday, 11 December 2007

"Protecting" doctors (allegedly)

On the 30th August, Dr Helen Jackson, a GP, was stabbed at work in her Glasgow surgery. In a radio interview the next morning the Minister for Public Health, Shona Robison, committed to extending the Emergency Workers (Scotland) Act 2005 to cover GPs and other primary health care staff. She said:

“Primary care staff in particular I have always argued were the key group of staff which should have always be included in that legislation because they work in the community often in relative isolation with not many people around and about them and they were always more vulnerable. It is just unfortunate that those calls weren't heeded when the legislation was going through, but we intend to make that right now, as quickly as we can.”


And Ms Robison has now gone one step further towards doing just that, announcing yesterday that a statutory instrument will be made - as permitted under section 8 of the 2005 Act - to extend it to “doctors, nurses and midwives whenever and wherever they are on duty”.


What does the 2005 Act do? It creates various offences of assaulting or impeding emergency workers. Of course, assaulting anyone is a criminal offence, but significantly, the Act allowed sheriffs to hand out stiffer sentences in summary procedure than they could normally do in such cases (a maximum of nine months as opposed to the default of three). There is also some value in having specific offences of impeding people responding to emergencies, where there may have been no clear assault (and doctors, nurses and midwives responding to emergencies are already covered).


But shrieval summary sentencing powers were increased to twelve months across the board yesterday, so the sentencing powers under the Act now confer no advantage. In any event, the assault on Dr Jackson is far too serious to be prosecuted under summary procedure (the only way in which offences under the 2005 Act can be) and proceedings have been taken in the High Court against her alleged attacker.


So what is the rationale for yesterday’s announcement? The Minister’s civil servants have clearly advised her that the attack on Dr Jackson cannot possibly provide any justification for what she said she would do when being – well, interviewed about the attack on Dr Jackson – and so the press release states that “The initial stimulus for the [2005] Act was a perception that more serious cases affecting emergency workers (such as the recent stabbing of a Glasgow GP) were effectively handled by the criminal justice system but less serious cases were sometimes overlooked - hence the focus of the Act on summary cases."

There is only one problem with this claim – it’s directly contradicted by what the Executive actually said in proposing the 2005 legislation. Then, the Executive said explicitly that it was “unlikely that the Bill will lead to a significant increase in the number of prosecutions for attacks on emergency workers” (para 16 of the Policy Memorandum), pointing out that the Lord Advocate had already issued clear instructions to procurators fiscal on dealing with such attacks.

Admittedly, the actual rationale the Executive provided was itself problematic. It said that the legislation was “intended to make clear that such attacks are entirely unacceptable and, by highlighting the issue, serve to have a deterrent effect” (para 5 of the Memorandum).

That wasn’t hugely convincing, but it is just about arguable that an Act being passed by Parliament providing for increased sentences for assaults on emergency workers might have some educative or deterrent effect. But that is not what Ms Robison proposes to do. Ms Robison has proposed to make a statutory instrument providing for anyone who assaults a GP to be liable to – well, exactly the same sentence as they are already.


But the fact that the proposal is useless is unlikely to lead to any dispute: it can hardly be said to do any harm, and even if opposition politicians have their doubts about its usefulness, being seen to oppose “protection” for healthcare workers is probably on a par with being photographed drowning kittens. All this, however, allows the Government to be seen to be doing something (even if it really isn’t), and it provides an opportunity for trade unions to be seen fighting to protect their members (even if they really aren’t). The BBC has reported the comments of Unison’s Scottish organiser, Dave Watson, who thinks that the Government has not gone far enough:


“Mr Watson said: ‘The act is called the Emergency Workers Act - not the Emergency Health Workers Act - and it was intended to cover all types of public service workers in emergency situations.’ He said the union had long argued it should have a wider application, which could include social care workers in residential and home care, education workers in schools, environmental officers tracking illegal dumping, traffic wardens and safety wardens and utility workers.”


If Ms Robison were right about her proposed statutory instrument protecting primary care staff, then Mr Watson might have a point and the law should be extended further. But she isn’t and he doesn’t and it shouldn’t.


Monday, 10 December 2007

Criminal justice reform: last-ditch protesting

Today, a whole series of provisions in the Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007 Act were brought into force (click here for the commencement order). They include, amongst other things, a substantial increase in summary sentencing powers (see earlier post), an important new power allowing appellate courts to excuse “procedural irregularities” (section 40) and provisions for trial of the accused in his absence if he fails to appear (section 14).

A couple of weeks ago, the president of the Glasgow Bar Association, Gerry Considine, published an article in the Sunday Times (25/11/07) headed “An attack on justice for all” (thanks to James Harrison for drawing this to my attention). The article, which is unfortunately not available online, starts off by saying:

“Over the next six months, the Scottish government proposes to introduce a series of changes to the legal system. The proposals have received little public attention, yet it is no exaggeration to say that they represent the most fundamental attack on citizens’ rights and liberties in our recent history.”

Many of the changes Mr Considine attacks are those contained in the 2007 Act, and there is a lot of sense in what he says. It would be impossible to engage with all his arguments here without writing a full-length article, but there is one key point underlying his argument, relating to the process of change:

“The proposed changes were drawn up by representatives of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) along with the police, the Scottish government and the Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB). There was not a single defence lawyer representing the rights of the accused. This is contrary to our obligations under the United Nations Convention.”

It would be quite encouraging to find a “United Nations Convention” which insisted that defence lawyers be represented on criminal justice reform committees, but unfortunately I have no idea what Convention this might be (please click here for a list of the 50 or so options, including the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space and the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, and submit your answers on a virtual postcard).

It is true that the McInnes Committee, whose 2004 report led to most of the present reforms and may or may not be the body Mr Considine refers to – perhaps not, as it had no SLAB representative among its members – did not include a defence lawyer among its membership. (That may not mean that none was invited to take part.) But in fairness, it must be acknowledged that it carried out a consultation exercise to which 117 responses were received, mostly on behalf of organisations (click here for a list). The Glasgow Bar Association did respond, but appears to be the only organisation of defence lawyers which did so. (The Scottish Law Agents Society also responded.)

When the resulting Bill was going through Parliament, the Justice 1 Committee received 51 written submissions (click here: some respondents made more than one submission), including ones from the Glasgow Bar Association, the Law Society of Scotland and the Faculty of Advocates, as well as one criminal defence lawyer.

What can we conclude from this? One of the great difficulties with law reform is that concerns about the reforms tend only to materialise at a late stage, often when legislation is close to being passed by Parliament. Polemical newspaper articles two weeks before legislation is due to commence, however well argued and correct they may be, have no hope whatsoever of influencing an Act passed in January 2007. If these reforms are “the most fundamental attack on citizens’ rights and liberties in our recent history”, why, when the consultations mentioned above were carried out, were there so few responses from defence agents and seemingly none from human rights and civil liberties organisations? If hardly anyone protests at the erosion of rights, liberties, and protections under the law, should we really be surprised when it happens?

Update (20/5/08): A correspondent has rightly pointed out that the Law Society representative on the McInnes Committee, Alistair Duff, was a defence solicitor. He was appointed a sheriff in 2004. The same correspondent has suggested that Mr Considine might have had the process leading to the Summary Justice System Model paper in mind. By that stage, of course, the issues of principle had been settled by legislation.

Tuesday, 4 December 2007

A victory for common sense (and strippers) [UPDATED AGAIN - AND AGAIN]

The offensive weapons charges against Aberdeen stripper Stuart Kennedy (see yesterday's post) were today thrown out of court after Sheriff Kenneth Stewart upheld a defence submission of no case to answer. It appears that Sheriff Stewart decided that Mr Kennedy did indeed have a "reasonable excuse" for carrying batons and a spray while dressed as a policeman, noting that the Crown had not analysed the contents of the "spray". The full story is on the BBC News website.

Update (4/12): The BBC News story mentioned earlier has since been fleshed out, and another report has appeared in the Herald. The latter report sheds some light on the decision to charge Mr Kennedy, who allegedly said that the spray he carried was for self-defence because "drunk guys get very jealous of male strippers".


More surprising is the updated BBC News report, which quotes a statement issued by the Crown:

"We are satisfied that the decision to raise proceedings in this case was entirely appropriate, and in the public interest. It is entirely and appropriately a matter for the Sheriff to determine the outcome, having seen and heard the evidence given in Court. We note the Sheriff's decision in this case. The Crown has no right of appeal against a decision by a Sheriff to uphold a no case to answer submission."

Opinions may differ on whether it was appropriate to bring the case, but - unless I am misunderstanding something here - it is remarkable to see an official statement claiming that the Crown has no right of appeal in this case. It is true that the Crown has no right of appeal against a decision of no case to answer in solemn proceedings (jury trial), but the proceedings against Mr Kennedy were brought under summary procedure (without a jury). (This is not made clear in today's reports - save to the extent that there is no mention of a jury - but a BBC News report of earlier proceedings refers to a date being fixed for an intermediate diet, something which exists only in summary procedure. In any case, it is surely unlikely that the prosecutor could have thought that the six month maximum sentence available under summary procedure would be insufficient in this case.)

In summary procedure, a decision of a sheriff to uphold a submission of no case to answer and acquit the accused may be appealed under section 175(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. Such appeals are not uncommon, which makes the statement - assuming the quote on the BBC News website is accurate - all the more peculiar. But perhaps it is for the best.

Update (5/12, 9.30am): The BBC News report was amended again after the above post was written, removing the sentence "
The Crown has no right of appeal against a decision by a Sheriff to uphold a no case to answer submission" from the Crown statement. There is no way of telling whether the original text was a Crown error or if the BBC made the double error of reporting that the Crown had no right of appeal and mistakenly including that claim as part of the quote. A report in today's Scotsman carries the same quote as is now found on the BBC website. A Press and Journal report includes a truncated version of the quote and states that the "spray" contained only coloured water and that Mr Kennedy faces further charges of impersonating a police officer. Whether those will be proceeded with given the barrage of criticism this prosecution has received (see the Scotsman report in particular) remains to be seen.

Update (5/12, 11.30am): The BBC News report seems to have been amended again since I last wrote, despite reading "Last Updated: Tuesday, 4 December 2007, 19:58 GMT". According to the latest version, the Crown "
said that it would consider looking into appealing the decision", which is quite a turnaround. The BBC report now refers to a "statement issued on Tuesday", which is a strange phrase to use in a report which purports to have been written and published that same day.

Monday, 3 December 2007

[Insert lewd joke here]

Did you hear the one about the male stripper and the offensive weapon?

No, really… Stuart Kennedy, who pays his way through university in Aberdeen by working as a police stripogram called Sergeant Eros, has gone on trial accused of carrying offensive weapons in a public place, the weapons being batons and a spray. The only evidence so far appears to have come from a police officer who explained that after encountering Mr Kennedy outside the bar where he was due to perform, she followed him inside so that she and her colleague could “keep an eye on him”.

Mr Kennedy appears to have been charged under section 47 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, which makes it an offence to carry an offensive weapon in public “without lawful authority or reasonable excuse”. He has not been charged with an impersonation offence under section 43 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967. That may be because there is an exception to that offence where the accused was “taking part in a stage play, or music hall or circus performance”, although which of these three headings removing one's clothing in the Paramount Bar falls under is not obvious.

A stripper in costume would seem to have a good claim to a “reasonable excuse”. That concept must be interpreted with the purpose of the legislation in mind: that is, to protect the public from persons who may use such weapons to cause or threaten injury (Lister v Lees 1994 SCCR 548), and there are few reports (to this writer’s knowledge) of male strippers going berserk. In England, the Court of Appeal has accepted that wearing a police truncheon as part of fancy dress can be a reasonable excuse under the equivalent legislation applying there (Houghton v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester (1987) 84 Cr App R 319).

But it would be wrong to prejudge whatever evidence might be led when proceedings resume tomorrow. No doubt all will be revealed in due course. It is unclear whether the same applies to Mr Kennedy’s stage act.

Thursday, 29 November 2007

Jury riders - and a fine mess

Posted yesterday on the Scottish courts website (but apparently issued last week), a report of some very peculiar procedures. The case is HM Advocate v Tracey [2007] HCJ 14.

What seems to have happened in this case is as follows. Mr Tracey was charged with having unlawful sexual intercourse with DM, who was under the age of thirteen, on a “number of occasions”. He pled guilty as libelled, and both he and the judge signed that plea. Thereafter, the Crown and his solicitor explained that there was a dispute as to some facts which would be relevant to sentence, particularly his knowledge of DM’s age and whether or not he had intercourse with her on a third occasion after being told of her age.

Since neither of these facts had the slightest bearing on whether Mr Tracey was guilty of the offence or not, the proper course of action might have seemed obvious: either (a) the Crown would have to accept Mr Tracey’s claims for the purposes of sentencing or (b) a proof in mitigation would have to be held, before a judge sitting without a jury. And a proof in mitigation was exactly what the advocate depute and Mr Tracey’s solicitor asked for.

B
ut the judge, Lord Turnbull, was having none of this. He took the view that these were matters for a jury to decide – seemingly by attaching a rider to their verdict – and directed that a plea of not guilty be recorded. The case called for a continued preliminary hearing before Lady Dorrian and finally went to trial before Lord Uist. When the Crown case had closed, Mr Tracey’s agent explained that he intended to call no evidence and that he would be inviting the jury to convict his client.

Un
surprisingly, this peculiar spectacle of a “trial” appears to have caused Lord Uist some concern (not that Mr Tracey’s agent can be criticised in any way). After legal debate, he issued an opinion to the effect that (a) it was doubtful that Lord Turnbull had any power to annul Mr Tracey’s original plea once it had been signed but even if he did, (b) juries should not be invited to add riders to their verdict (meaning that the jury could do nothing useful in this case) and that (c) the matters in dispute between the Crown and defence were a matter for him – which he would determine on the evidence already led – and not for the jury. A plea of guilty was then tendered and the advocate depute moved for sentence, which will take place at a later date.

(All
this is procedurally very difficult. Lord Uist takes the view that the initial guilty plea, once signed by Mr Tracey and the judge, "constituted a conviction which could be removed only by being quashed on appeal" (para 7). But if that is true, then surely Mr Tracey was not entitled to plead guilty after the trial, having already been convicted of the offence? And can a sentence still competently be imposed on the first conviction given the proceedings thereafter? Perhaps thankfully, no argument along these lines was made.)

L
ord Uist reviews the authorities on jury riders in some detail, and his opinion on this neglected topic is well worth reading. In addition, it might be observed that Lord Turnbull’s initial actions seem incompatible with the case law on pleas in mitigation. In that regard, the appeal court has said that an accused is, in mitigation, entitled to deny any statements made by the Crown unless his denial is inconsistent with his plea of guilty or is manifestly false given other admissions which he has made (Galloway v Adair 1947 JC 7). Mr Tracey’s claims would not have come close to falling foul of that rule.

Update (11/01): Mr Tracey was today sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment and placed on the sex offenders register. See this post.

Tuesday, 27 November 2007

Short-term sentences and short-term problems

From the BBC News website today, a report of a sheriff livid at not being able to impose a longer custodial sentence. Sheriff Liddle sentenced two youths to 72 days in custody for an unprovoked attack on a stranger, remarking:

"You two are young thugs, nothing more, nothing less. I tell you this, right here and now, you are lucky this charge was not brought on indictment, because if it had been that would have allowed me to pass the custodial sentence this case deserves. I can't because you are first offenders and it is on summary complaint. The maximum I can sentence you to is three months, which is woefully inadequate. Worse than that, I can't even do that, because you are entitled to a discount for the early plea."

They were lucky in more ways than one. Thirteen days from today, on the 10th of December, the sentencing powers of sheriffs in summary cases are to increase to twelve months’ imprisonment (
click here for the order implementing the relevant section (43) of the Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007). Had proceedings against these accused been taken at a later date, matters could have been rather different.

“Retrospective” use of these sentencing powers would not seem to be contrary to the ECHR. Although article 7 prevents courts from imposing “a heavier penalty… than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed”, that does not seem to be relevant here unless the crime concerned is one which cannot be prosecuted on indictment: if it is, penalties of 12 months (or more) would always have been “applicable”.

But full retrospectivity would probably have led to all sorts of distortions and difficult calculations about how and when to prosecute cases and whether to tender or accept pleas – and no doubt, appeals from aggrieved persons sentenced just after the 10th of next month. Accordingly, the implementing order makes transitional provisions (see article 12): the increased sentencing powers are only to be available in cases where a first calling took place on or after the 10th, or there has been no first calling but a warrant was granted on or after that date. All is not lost to armchair commentators who look for trouble, however: interesting questions may arise in respect of any proceedings which are commenced before the 10th but abandoned and restarted de novo at a later date.